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THE CASE OF THE RELIGIOUS GAY BLOOD DONOR
BRIAN SOUCEK*
ABSTRACT
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) prohibits sexually
active gay men from donating blood. This Article envisions an
original legal challenge to that rule: not the predictable equal
protection suit, but a religious freedom claim brought by a gay man
who wants to give blood as an act of charity. Because the FDA’s
regulations substantially burden his exercise of religion—requiring
a year of celibacy as its price—the FDA would be forced to show that
its policy is the least restrictive means of preventing HIV transmis-
sion through the blood supply. Developments in testing technology
and the experience of other countries suggest that this would be hard
to prove.
A lawsuit like this would either produce a major victory for gay
rights or, as likely, would force courts to clarify and curtail some of
the most controversial aspects of recent, mostly conservative, religious
freedom efforts: their expansive view of religious burdens and their
willingness to impose costs on the government or other third parties.
In other words, by appropriating legal arguments from the right, a
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lawsuit like this presents a win-win proposition for progressive lit-
igators. This Article considers why mainstream gay rights orga-
nizations may nonetheless shy away from bringing it.
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INTRODUCTION
Sexually active gay men cannot donate blood under current fed-
eral law.1 But federal law also prohibits the government from
substantially burdening someone’s religious practice unless it is the
least restrictive way of advancing a compelling governmental in-
terest.2 So what happens if a gay man wants to donate blood as an
act of charity—a religious practice encouraged by his church?3
This Article imagines the lawsuit that might allow him to do so.
The suit could go either of two ways. Given the generous under-
standing of religious liberty law in recent Supreme Court opinions,4
the case might be an easy win. Requiring celibacy as the price of
living one’s faith surely counts as a burden that is substantial; and
public health, while clearly a compelling governmental interest,
does not necessitate such draconian means, as the experiences of
other countries, the testimony of medical experts, and advances in
HIV testing all make clear.5 A win for the plaintiff would be a major
1. See CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., REVISED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REDUCING THE RISK OF HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY
VIRUS TRANSMISSION BY BLOOD AND BLOOD PRODUCTS 13-14 (2015), https://www.fda.gov/
downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidance/
Blood/UCM446580.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CPR-RPY4]. Blood is not the only thing gay men
have been restricted from donating. For an excellent discussion of a similar ban on sperm
donations, as well as litigation strategies that could be used against it, see Luke A. Boso,
Note, The Unjust Exclusion of Gay Sperm Donors: Litigation Strategies to End Discrimination
in the Gene Pool, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 843 (2008).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b) (2012).
3. A 2015 Pew Research Center study found that 59 percent of lesbian, gay, and bisexual
Americans were religiously affiliated. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICA’S CHANGING RELI-
GIOUS LANDSCAPE 87 (2015), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2015/
05/RLS-08-26-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXQ8-AAAP].
4. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2766-79 (2014).
5. See I. Glenn Cohen et al., Reconsideration of the Lifetime Ban on Blood Donation by
Men Who Have Sex with Men, 312 JAMA 337, 338 (2014), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/
jama/fullarticle/1889152 [https://perma.cc/99FB-ARNC] (“Scientific advances in diagnostic
technology and the experience of other nations establish that [the men who have sex with men
(MSM) policy] is no longer tenable, defensible, or necessary. Instead, every indication is that
the ... ban on blood donation by sexually active MSMs, an exclusionary policy questioned on
moral, scientific, and legal grounds, may be overdue for repeal and replacement with an
inclusive and scientifically valid approach.”).
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gay rights victory, undermining an enduring and stigmatizing policy
remnant of the AIDS crisis.6
On the other hand, the government might claim that giving blood
is not really a form of religious exercise, or that even if it is, it is a
religious calling that can be answered in alternate ways. A gay man
who wants to be charitable can donate money or time or soup—not
blood. The government might also claim that expanding the pool of
blood donors would either increase costs, if it is to be done safely, or
would marginally increase the rate of HIV transmission through the
blood supply—thereby imposing burdens on third parties such as
hemophiliacs and others who depend on blood transfusions.
This is all to say that the religious gay plaintiff could lose. But his
loss would likely require courts to clarify—and curtail—some of the
most controversial aspects of recent, mostly conservative, religious
freedom efforts: The expansive and deferential notion of “substantial
burden” at play in cases such as Hobby Lobby,7 and the disregard for
governmental and third-party costs seen in recent actions by the
Department of Justice,8 the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices,9 and those across the country seeking exemptions to anti-
discrimination laws that protect gays and lesbians.10 In short, the
6. See Dov Fox, The Expressive Dimension of Donor Deferral, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 42, 43
(2010) (describing the “demeaning message that donor exclusion expresses”).
7. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759; cf. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560-61 (2016)
(expressing no opinion on the “substantial[ ] burden[ ]” question but vacating and remanding
to the Courts of Appeals).
8. See Memorandum from Jefferson Sessions, Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to All Exec.
Dep’ts & Agencies 4-5 (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1001891/
download [https://perma.cc/8A4C-3CJU].
9. See Office for Civil Rights, HHS Announces New Conscience and Religious Freedom
Division, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/about/
news/2018/01/18/hhs-ocr-announces-new-conscience-and-religious-freedom-division.html
[https://perma.cc/3JFL-ZKGF].
10. See, e.g., Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act, H.B.
1523, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016); Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct.
2671, 2671 (2018) (mem.) (regarding a florist’s refusal to sell wedding arrangements to same-
sex couples), vacating and remanding in State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash.
2017); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)
(involving a cake shop owner’s refusal to make wedding cakes for same-sex couples); EEOC
v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 566, 585-97 (6th Cir. 2018) (denying
a funeral home a religious exemption to Title VII’s protections for transgender employees);
Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. Miller, No. BCV-17-102855, 2018 WL 747835, at *1 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2018) (also involving a cake shop owner’s refusal to make cakes for same-
sex couples); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 58-59 (N.M. 2013) (concerning
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case is a coin toss: heads, gay rights advocates win; tails, religious
conservatives lose.
It needs to be asked, then, why gay rights advocates are not
clamoring to bring such a case. Perhaps they just have not thought
of it; after all, it has never been proposed in academic literature.
But Part IV of this Article argues that deeper considerations may be
at play: worries about the way this litigation could provoke antigay
backlash and reinforce stereotypes, even as it promises to disrupt
the stereotypical opposition between religion and gay rights.
Before getting there, Part III, the heart of the Article, shows how
this hypothesized challenge brings together in a single case all of
the deepest unanswered questions in recent religious liberty
law—from the nature of religious burdens and the fungibility of
religious practice, to the costs of granting exemptions and the ways
those costs can be disbursed without violating the Constitution. Part
III looks at how a religious gay blood donor could win either by
actually winning his case, or by a loss that manages to curb recent
advances in religious freedom law that are currently threatening
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) and women’s
rights.
Prior to that, Part II shows how a religious freedom challenge to
the gay blood donation ban differs from the more predictable equal
protection challenge that others have discussed11—and how the
a photographer who “refused to photograph a commitment ceremony between two women”);
Alan Blinder & Tamar Lewin, Clerk in Kentucky Chooses Jail Over Deal on Same-Sex Mar-
riage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), https:// www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/kim-davis-same-
sex-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/D7XU-BZQV].
11. See, e.g., Michael Christian Belli, The Constitutionality of the “Men Who Have Sex with
Men” Blood Donor Exclusion Policy, 4 J.L. & SOC’Y 315, 362-75 (2003) (claiming that the MSM
policy violates the equal protection clause because it does not address the rise in HIV
infections among heterosexuals); Luke A. Boso, Dignity, Inequality, and Stereotypes, 92 WASH.
L. REV. 1119, 1158-60 (2017) (“[T]he government’s reliance on statistical stereotypes
subordinates gay and bisexual men.”); Dwayne J. Bensing, Comment, Science or Stigma:
Potential Challenges to the FDA’s Ban on Gay Blood, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 485, 495 (2011)
(“The FDA blood policy treats gay men differently than similarly situated straight donors,
thereby raising constitutional equal protection concerns.”); Vianca Diaz, Comment, A Time
for Change: Why the MSM Lifetime Deferral Policy Should Be Amended, 13 U. MD. L.J. RACE,
RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 134, 144 (2013) (contending that the blood ban “not only violates
... equal protection ... but also fails to account for the advancements in HIV/AIDS testing”);
Mathew L. Morrison, Note, Bad Blood: An Examination of the Constitutional Deficiencies of
the FDA’s “Gay Blood Ban”, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2363, 2390-95 (2015) (arguing that the FDA’s
blood ban has a discriminatory effect on gay men, is overinclusive, and should be subject to
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former may be a stronger claim. Part I begins by explaining the ban
that is at issue in everything that follows.
I. THE MSM BLOOD BAN
The ban on blood donations by men who have had sex with other
men (MSM) was born in necessity. When AIDS was first identified
in the early 1980s, sex between men and blood transfusions were
among the most common—and first identified—ways that the dis-
ease spread.12 But until the link to HIV was established, and a test
to screen for it was developed in 1985,13 preventing donations by
high risk blood donors was the only way to keep the blood supply
safe.14
In the three decades since then, advances in testing “have re-
duced the risk of HIV transmission from blood transfusion from
about 1 in 2500 units prior to HIV testing to a current estimated
residual risk of about 1 in 1.47 million transfusions.”15 Yet the
strict scrutiny).
12. See COMM. TO STUDY HIV TRANSMISSION THROUGH BLOOD & BLOOD PRODS., INST. OF
MED., HIV AND THE BLOOD SUPPLY 20 (Lauren B. Leveton et al. eds., 1995) (ebook).
13. Id.
14. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 2. In what follows, I
focus solely on HIV risks in order to provide a more focused argument. But HIV is, of course,
not the only threat to the blood supply. See BARBEE I. WHITAKER ET AL., THE 2013 AABB
BLOOD COLLECTION, UTILIZATION, AND PATIENT BLOOD MANAGEMENT SURVEY REPORT 44
(2015) (“High-risk behavior deferrals are intended to reduce the risk of transmission of
infectious diseases, including HIV and hepatitis viruses. Deferrals for other medical reasons
may include exposure to human-derived growth hormone, bovine insulin, hepatitis B immune
globulin, unlicensed vaccines, or those presenting with physical conditions or symptoms that
disqualify a person from donating blood.”). The United States Food and Drug Administration
requires blood banks to test for hepatitis, for example, and the window period in which
hepatitis is undetectable is different than that of HIV. See CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION
& RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NUCLEIC ACID TESTING (NAT) FOR
HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS TYPE 1 (HIV-1) AND HEPATITIS C VIRUS (HCV): TESTING,
PRODUCT DISPOSITION, AND DONOR REFERRAL AND REENTRY 1, 3 (2017) [hereinafter CTR. FOR
BI O L O G I C S  EV A L U A T I O N  & RESEARCH, NU CLE I C  AC I D  TE S T I N G ], https://
www.fda.gov/downloads/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformati
on/Guidances/Blood/UCM210270.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG5H-MYT2]. The potential case
described in Part III, infra, would have to account for this. But doing so would not affect the
structure or point of the argument I am making here.
15. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 2.
1900 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1893
euphemistically described “deferral” policies affecting gay blood
donors have not kept up.16
In 1983, the U.S. Public Health Service announced that:
As a temporary measure, members of groups at increased risk
for AIDS should refrain from donating plasma and/or blood. This
recommendation includes all individuals belonging to such
groups, even though many individuals are at little risk of AIDS.
Centers collecting plasma and/or blood should inform potential
donors of this recommendation.17
“[S]exually active homosexual or bisexual men with multiple part-
ners” were among the groups listed as high risk.18 Though blood
donation centers were told to publicize the recommendation, they
were not required to question donors about their sexual behavior,
much less their sexual orientation.19
In 1985, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
refashioned its donor deferral recommendations to say that “any
man who has had sex with another man since 1977 should not do-
nate blood or plasma. This applies even to men who may have had
only a single contact and who do not consider themselves homosex-
ual or bisexual.”20
16. See id.
17. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Prevention of Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS): Report of Inter-Agency Recommendations, 32 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 101, 102 (1983) [hereinafter Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Prevention
of AIDS]; see also Shawn Carroll Casey, Illicit Regulation: A Framework for Challenging the
Procedural Validity of the “Gay Blood Ban”, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 551, 555 (2011) (discussing
this announcement).
18. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Prevention of AIDS, supra note 17, at 102; see
also Casey, supra note 17, at 555.
19. See COMM. TO STUDY HIV TRANSMISSION THROUGH BLOOD & BLOOD PRODS., supra note
12, at 108. This language and the involvement of a variety of stakeholders—including gay
rights groups, see id. at 111-12—in drafting the original deferral policies complicate the notion
that blood donation policies have always been tainted by antigay animus. See generally Adam
R. Pulver, Gay Blood Revisionism: A Critical Analysis of Advocacy and the “Gay Blood Ban”,
17 LAW & SEXUALITY 107 (2008) (arguing that gay rights advocates should focus on scientific
advances rather than alleged homophobia in lobbying for changes to the MSM policy). The
inclusion also complicated any potential legal claims that are based on that notion. See infra
Part II (discussing disparate impact and animus-based equal protection claims).
20. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Update: Revised Public Health Service
Definition of Persons Who Should Refrain from Donating Blood and Plasma—United States,
34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 547, 547 (1985) [hereinafter Ctrs. for Disease Control
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On the one hand, the rewording tried to deemphasize the link to
sexual orientation. Behavior rather than identity became the deci-
sive factor.21 But at the same time, the behavior deemed risky was
significantly broadened, from same-sex activity with multiple part-
ners to any single instance of male-male sexual contact anytime
since 1977.22 An FDA memorandum issued in 1992 clarified that
men who had had such contact were considered “unsuitable” donors,
banned from donating blood for the rest of their lives.23
The FDA’s 1985 policy was issued just as blood tests for HIV were
first being developed and donor deferrals were no longer the only
way of preventing transmission through the blood supply.24 But the
initial test, which screened for antibodies,25 not only resulted in a
high number of false positives but, far more troublingly in this
context, produced false negatives during an approximately six-to-
fourteen-week “window period” before antibodies could be detected
in someone’s blood.26 Even an eight-week window period, given in-
fection rates at the time, would have prodcued an estimated risk of
one HIV transmission for every 153,123 units of blood.27 Nucleic acid
& Prevention, Update: Revised Definition].
21. Compare id., with Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Prevention of AIDS, supra
note 17, at 102.
22. Compare Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Update: Revised Definition, supra
note 20, at 547, with Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Prevention of AIDS, supra note
17, at 102.
23. Memorandum from Kathryn C. Zoon, Director, Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Re-
search, to All Registered Blood Establishments, Revised Recommendations for the Prevention
of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Transmission by Blood and Blood Products 3 (Apr.
23, 1992), http://archive.li/UR72G [https://perma.cc/HY3C-RRU9]. Sexual contact is defined
to include oral, anal, and vaginal sex, with or without a condom. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS
EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 13 n.6; see also GAY MEN’S HEALTH CRISIS, A DRIVE
FOR CHANGE: REFORMING U.S. BLOOD DONATION POLICIES 8-9 (2010), http://www.gmhc.
org/files/editor/file/a_blood_ban_report2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/HNC9-WJDB] (discussing
the broad definition of sexual practices triggering the ban).
24. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
25. The first test to be developed is known as ELISA, an acronym for “enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assay.” COMM. TO STUDY HIV TRANSMISSION THROUGH BLOOD & BLOOD
PRODS., supra note 12, at 78; Casey, supra note 17, at 556.
26. See Chana A. Sacks et al., Rethinking the Ban—The U.S. Blood Supply and Men Who
Have Sex with Men, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 174, 175 (2017); see also COMM. TO STUDY HIV
TRANSMISSION THROUGH BLOOD & BLOOD PRODS., supra note 12, at 78; Thomas S. Alexander,
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Diagnostic Testing: 30 Years of Evolution, 23 CLINICAL &
VACCINE IMMUNOLOGY 249, 249 (2016).
27. Sacks et al., supra note 26, at 175.
1902 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1893
testing, which has now been in use for almost two decades, reduces
the window period between infection and detection dramatically: it
now spans only eleven days.28
Despite these dramatic changes in our ability to test for HIV, the
lifetime ban on MSM donors remained in place until 2015. At the
end of that year—after years of study and lobbying by stakeholders
as important as the Red Cross29—the FDA reduced the deferral
period for male donors to one year, bringing the MSM restriction in
line with those for heterosexuals who have had sex with an HIV-
positive partner (or partners), women who have sex with MSM, or
people treated for syphilis or gonorrhea.30
The FDA continues to study the revised one-year ban to deter-
mine whether it should be shortened further or otherwise changed.31
A call for comments on the policy produced 670 responses in 2016.32
Many used nearly identical words to decry “pressure from the rad-
ical Homosexual Lobby to ignore scientific evidence.”33 Others pro-
vided scientific evidence of their own.34
Dissatisfaction with the current one-year MSM ban stems from
several directions.35 First, a year is far longer than the eleven-day
28. Comment from Carl G. Streed Jr. et al., Chair, Advisory Comm. on LGBT Issues, Am.
Med. Ass’n, to U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Nov. 28, 2016) [hereinafter Comment from Streed],
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2016-N-1502-0119 [https://perma.cc/BS5E-NB
SH].
29. See Statement, AABB, Am.’s Blood Ctrs., & Am. Red Cross, Joint Statement Before
the Advisory Comm. on Blood Safety and Availability, on Donor Deferral for Men Who Have
Had Sex with Another Man (MSM) (June 15, 2010), http://www.aabb.org/advocacy/statements/
Pages/statement061510.aspx [https://perma.cc/6VRR-CNJ7].
30. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 1, 14-15.
31. See JENNIFER SCHARPF, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO FDA
DOCKET OPENED JULY 26, 2016: BLOOD DONOR DEFERRAL POLICY FOR REDUCING THE RISK OF
HIV TRANSMISSION BY BLOOD AND BLOOD PRODUCTS 8, 13 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/down
loads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/BloodVaccinesandOtherBiologics
/BloodProductsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM554820.pdf [https://perma.cc/454F-4KX4].
32. See id. at 13.
33. See Comment from Anonymous to U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 1, 2016), https://
www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2016-N-1502-0603 [https://perma.cc/2WCB-ZU2F];
see also SCHARPF, supra note 31, at 14 (noting that nearly half of the comments received that
were against changes to the deferral policy “appear[ed] linked to a single write-in campaign”).
34. See, e.g., Comment from Stephen L. Boswell et al., President & Chief Exec. Officer,
Fenway Cmty. Health Ctr., to U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Nov. 25, 2016), https://fenwayhealth.
org/wp-content/uploads/FDA-blood-donation-comment-final-112116.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W
E9-BKE4]; Comment from Streed, supra note 28.
35. For thoughtful criticism of the new policy, see Russell K. Robinson & David M. Frost,
2019] THE CASE OF THE RELIGIOUS GAY BLOOD DONOR 1903
window period in which current testing methods fail to detect the
presence of HIV.36 Second, although the move to a one-year ban
brought the United States in line with current policies in Australia,
Canada, and many European countries,37 other countries have now
moved to shorter deferral periods. Japan has a six-month deferral
for MSM, while the United Kingdom very recently switched from a
one-year to a three-month deferral.38 Still other countries, such as
Italy and Spain, have done away with standardized deferral periods
for MSM donors, replacing them with deferrals that apply to all do-
nors, based on individualized risk screening.39 Finally, testing do-
nors again after the window period could eliminate the need for
deferrals entirely. France now allows donors who have only had one
sexual partner in the past four months—no matter their gender—to
donate plasma,40 which is then frozen and quarantined until the
donor returns at least two months later and again tests negative for
HIV.41 Israel has just introduced a similar pilot program.42
These details will become important in Part III where, as we will
see, the alternatives available to the FDA’s current policy are what
might well determine whether a religious freedom claim wins or
loses.
The Afterlife of Homophobia, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 245-53 (2018).
36. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
37. Comment from Mary Gustafson, Vice President of Glob. Regulatory Policy, Plasma
Protein Therapeutics Ass’n, to U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.ppta
global.org/images/regulatory/Contributions/2016/FDAA16014_Final_Blood_donor_deferral
_policy_and_Attachment.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B9A-X94E].
38. Christopher McAdam & Logan Parker, An Antiquated Perspective: Lifetime Ban for
MSM Donations No Longer Global Norm, 16 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 21, 45 (2014); Har-
riet Agerholm, Gay Blood Donation Rules: How Has the Law Changed for LGBT People Look-
ing to Donate, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 28, 2017, 12:17 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
uk/home-news/gay-blood-donation-rules-today-law-change-how-lgbt-donate-aids-hiv-tests-
a8079651.html [https://perma.cc/3UGM-NXV2]. 
39. Sacks et al., supra note 26, at 176.
40. Whereas donations of red cells should be used within thirty-five to forty-two days,
plasma can be frozen for up to a year. What Happens to Donated Blood?, AM. RED CROSS,
https://www.redcrossblood.org/donate-blood/blood-donation-process/what-happens-to-donat
ed-blood.html [https://perma.cc/YDR5-3LY8].
41. Pierre Tiberghien et al., Changes in France’s Deferral of Blood Donation by Men Who
Have Sex with Men, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1485, 1485-86 (2017).
42. See Ido Efrati, Pilot Program in Israel Will Allow Gay Men to Donate Blood Without
Abstaining from Sex, HAARETZ (Jan. 11, 2018, 8:52 AM), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news
/.premium-pilot-program-will-allow-gay-israeli-men-to-donate-blood-1.5730127 [https://perma.
cc/SK4P-Q87H].
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II. EQUAL PROTECTION VERSUS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
A religious freedom suit is not the only, and hardly the most ob-
vious, way to challenge the gay blood ban. To describe the FDA’s
policy as a “gay blood ban,” in fact, is almost to describe the equal
protection challenge that could lead to its demise. Now that the Su-
preme Court has overturned, at least partly on equal protection
grounds, the federal Defense of Marriage Act43 and state same-sex
marriage bans,44 and now that sexual orientation explicitly receives
heightened equal protection scrutiny in some circuits,45 challenging
a regulation that discriminates against gay men—and arguably
trades in stereotypes about gay men as promiscuous and diseased—
might seem to be a sure thing.
But while an equal protection challenge to the FDA’s MSM de-
ferral would have strong odds, it is not a sure thing. So before
turning to the more adventuresome religious freedom challenge
imagined in the following Part, it is worth pausing to note why the
more predictable equal protection challenge might need some help.
To start, as a form of sexual orientation discrimination, the policy
is arguably both overinclusive and underinclusive.46 On the one
(underinclusive) hand, the MSM deferral obviously does not reach
all LGBT people, since it doesn’t apply to women; even among gay
and bisexual men, it extends only to those who have had sex with
another man in the last year.47 On the other (overinclusive) hand,
the MSM rule covers any number of men who do not identify as gay
or bisexual, but who have nonetheless had sex with another man.48
The same-sex marriage cases presented a similar issue: state
marriage laws limiting marriage to one man and one woman facially
discriminated on the basis of sex, not sexual orientation.49 For
43. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013).
44. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607-08 (2015).
45. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014);
Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181-85 (2d Cir. 2012). 
46. See Bensing, supra note 11, at 500-01; Diaz, supra note 11, at 151-52; Robinson &
Frost, supra note 35, at 253.
47. See CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 13-14.
48. See id.
49. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Risky Arguments in Social Justice Litigation: The Case of
Sex Discrimination and Marriage Equality, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 2087, 2099 (2014).
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example, two straight women would have been prevented from mar-
rying, whereas a gay man could marry a lesbian. But courts and
scholars were almost entirely untroubled by this,50 and attempts to
treat same-sex marriage bans as a form of sex discrimination
largely fizzled.51 Still, an unfazed plaintiff here might challenge the
MSM ban as facial sex discrimination, given that it distinguishes
the gender of the donor and his sexual partner(s). If accepted, this
claim would result in intermediate scrutiny—the same level of re-
view that a growing number of courts now give to sexual orientation
discrimination.52 So doctrinally, not much hinges on the choice.
Another choice would be to bring a disparate impact claim instead
of one alleging discrimination on the policy’s face. No one could
doubt, after all, that a ban on blood donations from men who have
had sex with men in the past year disproportionately affects gay
men. But federal equal protection doctrine is infamously inhospita-
ble to disparate impact claims.53 To win, plaintiffs have to show that
the policy being challenged was selected “at least in part ‘because
of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.”54 Here, plaintiffs would have to show that the FDA promul-
gated its regulations in order to keep gay men “in a stereotypic and
predefined place.”55 
The disparate impact argument,56 it turns out, thus starts to
resemble another approach that has loomed large in the “gay rights
canon”57: the search for animus.58 Both approaches look at whether
50. See Zachary Herz, The Marrying Kind, 83 TENN. L. REV. 83, 88 (2015).
51. See generally Goldberg, supra note 49 (discussing the widespread failures of sex dis-
crimination claims).
52. See supra note 45.
53. See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273-74, 279 (1979).
54. Id. at 279.
55. See id.
56. See Herz, supra note 50, at 109-11 (examining why challenges to same-sex marriage
bans, which also fail to facially discriminate based on sexual orientation, were not treated as
disparate impact claims); cf. Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151,
154-56, 171-98 (2016) (detailing the doctrinal exceptionalism of gay rights cases, particularly
regarding animus).
57. Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to Nonmarriage, 97 B.U. L.
REV. 425, 426 (2017).
58. See WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW 3-4, 120
(2017); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Marriage Equality, United States v. Windsor, and the Crisis
in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1045, 1045-46 (2014); Susannah W.
Pollvogt, Windsor, Animus, and the Future of Marriage Equality, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
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a “desire to harm a politically unpopular group” motivated the policy
in question.59 The doctrinal paths are multiple, but also overlapping.
For whatever the route—intermediate scrutiny for sexual orien-
tation discrimination or gender discrimination, disparate impact, or
animus—the equal protection analysis ends up in roughly the same
place. To win, the FDA would have to show a substantial non-
discriminatory policy reason for the current blood ban, a reason not
based in “overbroad generalizations” about gay men.60 Most likely,
the outcome would turn on what a majority of Justices found to
motivate the FDA’s policy: “inherent differences”61 between gay men
and others, or lingering fear and outmoded stereotypes.62
This, I think, would be a close call. There are significant statis-
tical differences, after all, between men and women who have sex
with men, between gay men and lesbians, and between gay and
bisexual men and heterosexual men when it comes to HIV rates. In
2016, 70 percent of newly diagnosed HIV infections were attributed
to male-to-male sexual contact; by contrast, 24 percent were at-
tributed to heterosexual contact, whether by men or women.63
Overall infection rates in 2016 were 5.4 for every 100,000 women,
but 24.1 per 100,000 men.64
204, 208 (2013).
59. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric.
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
60. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“The State must show ‘at least
that the [challenged] classification serves “important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed” are “substantially related to the achievement of those ob-
jectives.”’” (alteration in original) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982))); see also Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017) (“[T]he clas-
sification must substantially serve an important governmental interest today.”).
61. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533; see also Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
533 U.S. 53, 68 (2001).
62. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 565-66 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). As
Cary Franklin has recently argued, the Supreme Court has not always looked beyond bio-
logical arguments for signs of stereotyping in contexts involving gay people, but a 2017 case,
Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017), may signal a new willingness to do so. See Cary
Franklin, Biological Warfare: Constitutional Conflict over “Inherent Differences” Between the
Sexes, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. 169, 169-77, 184-93.
63. DIV. OF HIV/AIDS PREVENTION, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DIAG-
NOSES OF HIV INFECTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND DEPENDENT AREAS, 2017, at 6 (2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/library/reports/surveillance/cdc-hiv-surveillance-report-2017-vol-
29.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7AF-S5SB].
64. Id. at 17 tbl.1a.
2019] THE CASE OF THE RELIGIOUS GAY BLOOD DONOR 1907
These statistical differences are not necessarily dispositive. In the
case that established intermediate scrutiny for gender, Craig v.
Boren,65 the state of Oklahoma offered statistics about higher rates
of drunk driving among men to justify its law prohibiting men (but
not women) aged eighteen to twenty from buying low-proof beer.66
But the Court found the “statistical evidence ... a weak answer to
the equal protection question.”67 More gnomically, it claimed that
“proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is ... inevitably
... in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the
Equal Protection Clause.”68 
Statistics such as the ones above would at the very least compli-
cate an equal protection challenge, however. They bolster the FDA’s
claim that, especially after the latest round of studies, hearings, and
reports, the MSM deferral is based on true threats to public health,
not the kind of unfounded stereotypes that intermediate scrutiny
generally tries to smoke out.69 Whether the one-year deferral would
be seen as substantially related to the government’s public health
interest is hard to predict.70
Fortunately, the point here is not to make predictions, but to
show how a somewhat uncertain equal protection challenge and the
still-to-be-described religious freedom claim would differ, both in
their remedies and in their expressive potential.
65. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“[C]lassifications by gender must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”); id.
at 218 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (identifying the level of scrutiny as “intermediate”).
66. See id. at 191-92, 200-01 (majority opinion).
67. Id. at 201.
68. Id. at 204; see also Boso, supra note 11, at 1153-62 (describing and critiquing
“statistical stereotyping” based on gender and sexual orientation).
69. See CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 3-12; cf. Sessions
v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017) (“[T]he classification must substantially
serve an important governmental interest today, for in interpreting the equal protection
guarantee, we have recognized that new insights and societal understandings can reveal
unjustified inequality that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.” (quotation and
alteration marks omitted)).
70. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“How is this Court to divine
what objectives are important? How is it to determine whether a particular law is ‘sub-
stantially’ related to the achievement of such objective, rather than related in some other way
to its achievement? Both of the phrases used are so diaphanous and elastic as to invite sub-
jective judicial preferences or prejudices relating to particular types of legislation, mas-
querading as judgments whether such legislation is directed at ‘important’ objectives or,
whether the relationship to those objectives is ‘substantial’ enough.”). 
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One advantage of an equal protection claim is that it promises a
remedy for the affected group as a whole. Just as Obergefell led to
same-sex marriage nationwide,71 and Craig allowed all eighteen-
year-old men in Oklahoma to buy weak beer,72 a successful equal
protection challenge here would lead to a new policy for MSM
donors as a class. 
By contrast, a religious freedom claim would only directly benefit
the plaintiff. The government might go on to establish a system for
evaluating claims by others similarly situated, to determine wheth-
er they too should receive an exemption to the deferral. But even so,
a system of religious exemptions to the policy would divide potential
MSM donors into two camps: those who would be allowed to donate
for religious reasons, and those whose motivations were secular, and
to whom the one-year bar would still apply.
This difference in remedies points to an expressive difference
between the two types of claims. An equal protection challenge
would make the straightforward and powerful point that it is risky
behavior, not sexual orientation, that threatens the safety of the
blood supply.73 The fear and animus that may have driven the early
policies,74 and have kept similar ones in place since, would be forced
to give way to a “new perspective, a new insight”75 about gay men.
An equal protection challenge would directly challenge the long-
standing, stereotyped link between gay men and disease.76
Not so a religious freedom claim. Where the equal protection
claim says “treat gay men like everyone else,” the religious freedom
claim asks for some gay men to be treated differently than others.
Instead of targeting antigay animus head-on, the religious freedom
claim comes at the deferral from an angle. Problematically, it im-
plies that the problem is not the policy itself but just its application
to some of those deferred. 
At the same time, the religious freedom claim has a stereotype-
disrupting expressive potential of its own. By foregrounding a gay
71. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607-08 (2015).
72. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 191-92, 210.
73. See Belli, supra note 11, at 366-67.
74. But see supra note 19.
75. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 763 (2013).
76. See Belli, supra note 11, at 364-65; Fox, supra note 6, at 42-43 (highlighting the dis-
criminatory expressive meaning of the MSM deferral policy).
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plaintiff, the religious freedom claim would unsettle the stereotype
that homosexuality and religion are somehow at odds,77 or that re-
ligious freedom is the sole province of conservatives.78 The religious
freedom claim portrays gays fighting not for rights exclusive to
them—which could expose them to the charge that they care more
about their rights than public health—but for a value more broadly
shared: religious liberty.79 
And importantly, while an equal protection challenge needs to be
successful to realize its expressive potential,80 a religious freedom
claim does not. As I said at the outset, a religious freedom claim
offers plaintiffs on the left a potential win-win: either they win by
winning—by getting an exemption to the blood ban—or they win by
losing, as courts would be forced to curtail the expansive under-
standing of religious freedom that has, in recent years, endangered
contraception coverage,81 same-sex marriage,82 and LGBT health
care rights.83 A decision that stressed limits on what kinds of ex-
emptions are available, or what costs those exemptions can impose
on others, would be expressively and practically powerful, even if it
were a decision in which the gay plaintiff lost his case.84
77. See supra note 3 (citing statistics about the 59 percent of LGBT Americans who are
religiously affiliated).
78. See infra notes 240-41 (citing recent cases and scholarship attempting to use the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 in service of liberal ends).
79. For more on these points, see infra Part IV.
80. One exception to this would be a case in which the plaintiff lost but a court ac-
knowledged for the first time that sexual orientation should receive heightened scrutiny.
81. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759-60 (2014) (holding that
the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations requiring
that religious company owners provide contraceptive coverage to employees violated the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
82. See, e.g., Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (mem.)
(concerning a florist’s refusal to sell wedding arrangements to same-sex couples), vacating and
remanding in State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017); Masterpiece Cake-
shop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723-24 (2018) (involving a cake shop
owner’s refusal to make cakes for same-sex couples); Myrick v. Warren, EEOC Charge No.
430-2015-01202 at 3, 5-6, 9, 24 (Mar. 8, 2017) (holding that a magistrate judge’s employer
discriminated against her for not accommodating her desire to not participate in same-sex
marriages).
83. See Office for Civil Rights, supra note 9; see also Robbie Gonzalez, How the ‘Religious
Freedom Division’ Threatens LGBT Health—and Science, WIRED (Jan. 23, 2018, 6:42 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/how-the-religious-freedom-division-threatens-lgbt-healthand-
science/ [https://perma.cc/6HWT-2S3M].
84. See Catherine Albiston, The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of
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Part III thus looks at that case more closely and describes the
various ways it might go.
III. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CASE: A WIN-WIN?
Imagine a devout gay man. Perhaps he is one of the 17 percent of
LGBT Americans who identify as Roman Catholic,85 for whom giving
blood is among the seven “Corporal Works of Mercy”—what the
bishops of the United States describe as “charitable actions by
which we help our neighbors in their bodily needs.”86 Perhaps he
was moved when members of the “Blood Drive Ministry”87 at his
parish made an announcement at the end of Mass, telling congre-
gants that donating blood “clearly is an expression of the second
greatest commandment: love your neighbor as yourself. When you
give your life’s blood that another may live you are imitating Christ,
who gives us his very blood that we might live.”88
Losing by Winning, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869, 869, 871-72, 877 (1999) (discussing how repeat
players can shape “the development of [the] law by settling cases they are likely to lose and
litigating those they are likely to win”); Steven A. Boutcher, Mobilizing in the Shadow of the
Law: Lesbian and Gay Rights in the Aftermath of Bowers v. Hardwick, in RESEARCH IN SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS AND CHANGE 175, 175-76, 187-96 (Patrick G. Coy ed., 2011) (doc-
umenting the protests, coalition-building, and increased donations prompted by the gay rights
movement’s biggest defeat at the Supreme Court); Ben Depoorter, The Upside of Losing, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 817, 821 (2013) (examining “the ex ante strategic decisions faced by litigation
entrepreneurs who pursue litigation with the awareness that losing the case can provide sub-
stantial benefit”); Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 943-48,
969-72 (2011) (focusing on cases that advocates hope to win, but noting that “in some cir-
cumstances the turn to the second-best alternatives [after a loss] might actually produce a
more effective and robust movement in the long term”).
85. Though its data are not broken down by gender, the Pew Research Center found in
2015 that 17 percent of gay, lesbian, and bisexual survey respondents identified as Catholic,
as compared to 21 percent of straight respondents. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 3, at
87.
86. Corporal Works of Mercy, U.S. CONF. CATH. BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-
teachings/how-we-teach/new-evangelization/jubilee-of-mercy/the-corporal-works-of-mercy.cfm
[https://perma.cc/CX72-HFMA] (listing blood donation among the ways of “visit[ing] the sick,”
one of the seven Corporal Works of Mercy).
87. For examples of churches that have this ministry, see Blood Drive Ministry, CHRIST
GOOD SHEPHARD, https://cgsccdogh.org/blood-drive [https://perma.cc/E69S-99BF]; Blood Drive
Ministry, ROCK CHURCH, http://www.sdrock.com/ministries/blooddrive/ [https://perma.cc/HV
S5-92G3]; Blood Drive Ministry, SAINT MICHAEL ARCHANGEL CATH. CHURCH, https://saint-
mikes.org/blood-drive [https://perma.cc/2R6A-SRJY].
88. Mark Shea, Blood Donation Is Good, NAT’L CATH. REG. (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.
ncregister.com/blog/mark-shea/blood-donation-is-good [https://perma.cc/DCB3-Z8HN].
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As a sexually active gay man, our potential plaintiff is, to be sure,
not fully compliant with Catholic teaching.89 But federal law does
not require perfection, or perfect orthodoxy.90 The law protects the
religious exercise even of those who disagree with, or just fail to live
up to, certain teachings of their faith.91
The law in question is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA),92 introduced by then-Congressman Schumer and Sen-
ator Kennedy, passed by a nearly unanimous Congress, and signed
by President Clinton in 1993.93 RFRA is based on the idea that “laws
‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely
as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise,”94 and that
“governments should not substantially burden religious exercise
Comparisons of blood donors to Jesus are common. See, e.g., Janel Esker, Body and Blood, The
Fullness of His Life, BRINGING HOME WORD 1, 1 (June 7, 2015), http://strosechurch.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/BringingHometheWord-June-2015.pdf  [https://perma.cc/8WJH-UD
72] (“Jesus is, in a way, the ultimate blood donor. He gives us all of himself—Body and Blood,
the fullness of his life—in our eucharistic meal. Just as blood donations can sustain life for
the human family, Jesus’ gift of his Body and Blood is our sustaining spiritual life force.”);
Montreal’s Cardinal Turcotte, Cleric with Common Touch, Dies at Age 78, CATH. NEWS SERV.
(Apr. 8, 2015), https://goo.gl/MsmNWf [https://perma.cc/YH3U-4XMD] (“He asked people to
give blood for others as Jesus gave his blood for all.”).
89. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2359, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_
css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a6.htm [https://perma.cc/8DQK-AHZB] (“Homosexual persons
are called to chastity. By the virtues of self-mastery that teach them inner freedom, at times
by the support of disinterested friendship, by prayer and sacramental grace, they can and
should gradually and resolutely approach Christian perfection.”).
90. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981)
(“[T]he guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the
members of a religious sect. Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the judicial
function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more
correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.”); see also Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct.
853, 862-63 (2015).
91. Of course, we might also or instead imagine a plaintiff whose religious denomination
embraces homosexuality, see, e.g., Tobin Grant, Ranking Religions on Acceptance of Homo-
sexuality and Reactions to SCOTUS Ruling, RELIGION NEWS SERV. (June 30, 2015), https://
religionnews.com/2015/06/30/ranking-churches-on-acceptance-of-homosexuality-plus-their-
reactions-to-scotus-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/8MF3-PTSU], or an organizational plaintiff, such
as DignityUSA, that works to promote respect for, and inclusion of, LGBT Catholics within
their church; see DIGNITYUSA, https://www.dignityusa.org/ [https://perma.cc/9Z3Z-TUU6].
92. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4
(2012)).
93. Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
17, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/17/us/clinton-signs-law-protecting-religious-prac
tices.html [https://perma.cc/DBT6-B7G2].
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2).
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without compelling justification.”95 Thus, it provides a federal cause
of action against the government when it “substantially burden[s]
a person’s exercise of religion” without demonstrating that the bur-
den “is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling gov-
ernmental interest.”96 RFRA was later found unconstitutional as
applied to the states,97 but it remains in force against the federal
government.98
Imagine that our devout gay man—shut out from his church’s
blood drive by the FDA’s one-year deferral policy for MSMs—files
suit under RFRA. Here is how he might win, how he might lose, and
how the gay rights movement might end up winning regardless.
A. Winning by Winning
A successful case would be fairly straightforward. The burden
would fall first on the plaintiff to show that the FDA’s one-year
MSM deferral substantially burdens his sincere exercise of re-
ligion.99 Importantly, RFRA was amended in 2000 to clarify that it
protects “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief.”100 So here, the fact that
Catholics are not required to donate blood, or that donating blood is
95. Id. § 2000bb(a)(3).
96. Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
97. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
98. Congress subsequently passed RLUIPA, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
2000cc-5 (2012)), which re-applied RFRA’s protections to the states in the contexts of prisons
and land use. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 860 (2015). In what follows, I rely on RFRA
and RLUIPA caselaw interchangeably. RFRA now explicitly incorporates RLUIPA’s definition
of “exercise of religion.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4).
99. “In order to state a prima facie claim under RFRA, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) a
substantial burden imposed by the federal government on a (2) sincere (3) exercise of re-
ligion.’” O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1236,
1252 (D.N.M. 2002) (quoting Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir. 2001)); see also
Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (holding that, in order to establish a claim under
RLUIPA, a plaintiff must satisfy the same test in establishing that claim as a plaintiff
asserting a claim under RFRA); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774-75,
2774 n.28 (2014) (describing what a plaintiff must show upon asserting a claim under RFRA).
Hobby Lobby, a challenge to the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate, was brought
under RFRA, while Holt, a challenge to a state agency’s grooming policy for inmates, arose
under RLUIPA. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 859; Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775.
100. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761-62 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
5(7)(A)).
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nowhere near as central to Catholicism as are, say, the seven sac-
raments, does not preclude plaintiff ’s claim.
What matters is that plaintiff ’s belief is sincere, and that the
burden on him is substantial.101 And this, in fact, points to one of the
strengths of our imagined claim: that it does not seem self-inter-
ested.102 The request to spend half an hour with a needle in your
arm in order to help those who depend on the blood supply is a far
cry from religious freedom claims brought, for example, by pris-
oners103 who have claimed a sincere religious need to have “conjugal
visits, banquets, and payment for services as chaplain,”104 a white
cellmate,105 or a television.106 And significantly, the claim of the
religious gay blood donor is also far stronger, from a sincerity
standpoint, than those of others who have tried to appropriate con-
servative religious freedom arguments for nonconservative ends:
those such as the First Church of Cannabis, which formed after
Indiana passed its controversial state-level RFRA,107 or the Satanic
Temple that has recently challenged Missouri’s restrictive abortion
laws.108 As Professor Kent Greenawalt has written, “[A] finding that
a claimant is sincere should be easy if one cannot discern any sec-
ular advantage from a person’s engaging in the behavior she asserts
is part of her religious exercise.”109 Surely that is the case for the
religious gay blood donor: nobody donates blood for the sake of the
cookie or sticker they are given afterward.
101. See supra note 99.
102. But see infra notes 257-65 and accompanying text.
103. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774 (“[B]y the time of RLUIPA’s enactment, the pro-
pensity of some prisoners to assert claims of dubious sincerity was well documented.”).
104. Ochs v. Thalacker, 90 F.3d 293, 296 (8th Cir. 1996).
105. Winters v. State, 549 N.W.2d 819, 819-20 (Iowa 1996).
106. Manley v. Fordice, 945 F. Supp. 132, 135 (S.D. Miss. 1996).
107. See Sarah Pulliam Bailey, The First Church of Cannabis Was Approved After Indiana’s
Religious Freedom Law Was Passed, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/03/30/the-first-church-of-cannabis-was-approved-after-
indianas-religious-freedom-law-was-passed/ [https://perma.cc/YEM9-6KM3].
108. See Mary Papenfuss, Satanic Temple Religious Challenge to Missouri Abortion Laws
Heads to Court, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 22, 2018, 11:47 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.
com/entry/satanic-temple-missouri-abortion-challenge_us_5a6674b3e4b0e5630072cdc7
[https://perma.cc/M7XH-8ZMG].
109. 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 122-23 (2006).
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What is left for the plaintiff to show is that the burden the FDA
places on his exercise of religion is substantial.110 This would seem
easy, no matter whether we look to the substantiality of the conduct
being burdened or the substantiality of the burden itself. The former
distinguishes, for example, the Sacrament of Marriage from the tra-
dition of throwing rice at a wedding;111 the latter looks at the size of
the penalty or cost imposed on religious exercise: a prison term, say,
versus a one dollar fine for circumcising one’s child.112 As noted
already, for a Catholic such as our plaintiff, donating blood is among
the seven corporal works of mercy, an important act of charity.113
And the cost of donating—a year without sex, even oral sex with a
condom114—is hardly trivial either.
The best precedent for the religious gay blood donor to cite may
be a series of religious freedom cases that arose, perhaps surpris-
ingly, out of the bankruptcy courts. In cases such as In re Young, a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee tried to recover the money debtors
had tithed115 to their church over the previous year.116 “Even though
the church encourages but does not compel tithing,” the Eighth Cir-
cuit observed, “the debtors consider[ed] tithing to be an important
expression of their sincerely held religious beliefs.”117 Finding a
substantial burden, the court continued:
Permitting the government to recover these contributions would
effectively prevent the debtors from tithing, at least for the year
immediately preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petitions. We
do not think it is relevant that the debtors can continue to tithe
110. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
111. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 n.4 (1990); see also Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908
F. Supp. 1429, 1444 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
112. See Michael A. Helfand, The Substantial Burden Puzzle, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE
1, 5-6; see also Ira Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Symposium: Religious Questions and Saving Con-
structions, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 18, 2014, 11:12 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/sym
posium-religious-questions-and-saving-constructions/ [https://perma.cc/AM6L-A5FE] (discuss-
ing “two measures of substantiality” under RFRA: one secular, one religious).
113. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
114. See CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 13 n.6.
115. See Leviticus 27:30, 32 (New International Version) (“A tithe of everything from the
land, whether grain from the soil or fruit from the trees, belongs to the Lord; it is holy to the
Lord.... Every tithe of the herd and flock—every tenth animal that passes under the shep-
herd’s rod—will be holy to the Lord.”).
116. In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407, 1410 (8th Cir. 1996).
117. Id. at 1418.
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or that there are other ways in which the debtors can express
their religious beliefs that are not affected by the governmental
action. It is sufficient that the governmental action in question
meaningfully curtails, albeit retroactively, a religious practice of
more than minimal significance in a way that is not merely
incidental.118
The burden on the religious gay blood donor is, if anything, more
substantial than that on tithing debtors. For both, the affected reli-
gious exercise is an important, but not strictly quantified or com-
pelled form of charity; substitutes are possible.119 In both cases, the
governmental burden is not a complete prohibition,120 but an im-
posed cost: for the blood donor, a year of chastity; for the debtors,
increased donations after bankruptcy to make up for the recovered
money. Not only is this cost arguably greater for the blood donor—
especially since it would be imposed each time, unlike the one-time
recovery under Chapter 7—but bankruptcy law does not technically
prevent tithing at all—it merely revokes tithes offered in the past.121
Assuming courts followed this precedent and found the burden
substantial in the blood donor’s case, the onus would shift to the
government to show that the FDA’s policy serves its interest in pub-
lic health in the least religiously restrictive way.122 As the Supreme
Court has said, “RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate
that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of
the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular claimant whose
sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.”123 In
other words, the heavy burden on the FDA would be to show that
protecting the safety of the nation’s blood supply requires it to make
118. Id. at 1418-19. But see In re Newman, 183 B.R. 239, 251 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995)
(finding no substantial burden on the debtor’s tithing).
119. See generally Corporal Works of Mercy, supra note 86 (listing suggested charitable
action).
120. Cf. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423,
425 (2006) (finding that the government could not bar a church’s religious use of hoasca, a tea
brewed from plants containing a Schedule I hallucinogen).
121. See Newman, 183 B.R. at 251 (“The funds the trustee seeks to recover have already
been tithed to the defendant. The debtors, in all likelihood, continue to tithe to the defendant.
The debtors fulfilled their religious obligation by tithing in the year prior to their bankruptcy
filing.”).
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)(2) (2012). 
123. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 430-31 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)(2)).
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this particular plaintiff wait a year between having sex and do-
nating blood.
How could the FDA ever succeed in this? The alternatives to the
current system are almost embarrassingly plentiful. The FDA could
shorten the deferral period to six or even three months, as countries
such as Japan and the United Kingdom now do.124 It could evaluate
plaintiff ’s individual risk factors, asking about his number of part-
ners, sexual practices, and condom use.125 Or, if it really wanted to
ensure an HIV-negative blood donation, the FDA could quarantine
plaintiff ’s blood for two weeks until he returned for a second round
of testing, thereby guaranteeing that his original donation had not
fallen within the false-negative window period.126 Any of these
methods would seem to allow plaintiff to contribute to the blood
supply—and thus, to public health—without increasing the risk of
transmitting HIV. Given the less restrictive means it has at hand
for ensuring the safety of the blood supply, the FDA would be com-
pelled to provide plaintiff an exemption from its one-year MSM
deferral.
B. Winning by Losing
Straightforward as the religious gay plaintiff ’s case may seem, I
am not at all sure that he would win. The question thus becomes:
how could he lose? Any intellectually honest decision that ruled
against his claim would either have to reject or narrow one of the
several expansive interpretations of RFRA that have been advanced
in recent years, largely through litigation by conservative—pri-
marily Christian—religious liberty groups.127 Given the threat that
this expansive understanding of religious liberty currently poses to
LGBT rights,128 losing in this way may look more like winning.
124. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
125. Cf. supra note 39 and accompanying text. It is likely that the plaintiff in a suit like
this would be selected based on exactly these factors. See Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs,
125 YALE L.J.F. 136, 137 (2015) (noting that plaintiff selection is one of the most important
parts of bringing a case).
126. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Becket Case Database, BECKET, https://www.becketlaw.org/cases/ [https://
perma.cc/6WMH-RTSU]; View Our Cases, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, https://www.adf
legal.org/for-attorneys/cases [https://perma.cc/8ENH-3TYB].
128. See Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience
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What follows, then, are discussions of various ways a would-be
religious gay blood donor might lose his RFRA claim—and of the
effects that each particular loss might have on religious freedom
claims beyond his own.
1. The MSM Blood Ban Is Not a Substantial Burden on
Religion Because Other Forms of Charity Are Possible
The first way the plaintiff could lose is if the court denies that
being blocked from giving blood counts as a substantial burden on
religion. A court, so disposed, might decide that acts of charity are
fungible. Those who cannot give blood—whether because of the
MSM or other deferral policies or simply because they are not old
enough or do not weigh the required 110 pounds129—can assist the
sick in other ways. Catholic bishops suggest spending time at a
nursing home or making meals for families with sick loved ones as
alternate works of mercy.130 The Red Cross, meanwhile, encourages
those permanently deferred from giving blood to “host a blood drive”
or “make a financial donation” to support the Red Cross’s work.131
Surely, a court might say, one’s religious exercise is not substan-
tially burdened when it can be exercised in so many different, seem-
ingly equivalent, ways.
In support, the court might invoke Henderson v. Kennedy, a 2001
D.C. Circuit case in which evangelical Christians wanted a RFRA
exemption allowing them to sell t-shirts on the National Mall.132
Because they could give the shirts away on the Mall or sell them on
streets nearby—because, that is, “the Park Service’s ban on sales on
the Mall [was] at most a restriction on one of a multitude of means”
of evangelizing—the Henderson court found that “it [was] not a
substantial burden on their vocation.”133
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2558-65 (2015).
129. See Eligibility Requirements, AM. RED CROSS, https://www.redcrossblood.org/donate-
blood/how-to-donate-eligibility-requirements.html [https://perma.cc/LSV6-7G94].
130. Corporal Works of Mercy, supra note 86.
131. Other Ways to Help, AM. RED CROSS, https://www.redcrossblood.org/donate-blood/how-
to-donate/eligibility-requirements.html#other-ways-to-help [https://perma.cc/BS46-WQGB].
132. 253 F.3d 12, 13-14 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
133. Id. at 17.
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The problem with this is twofold. For one thing, the Henderson
approach seems to be in tension with amendments to RFRA in 2000
which clarified that it protects “any exercise of religion, whether
or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”134
Henderson brushes off this objection, insisting that “the amend-
ments did not alter the propriety of inquiring into the importance of
a religious practice when assessing whether a substantial burden
exists.”135 But as we will see in a moment, judging the importance
of religious practices is just the sort of thing that the Supreme Court
and many commentators have decried.136
A second problem is that, since Henderson, the Supreme Court
has made clear that the “‘substantial burden’ inquiry asks whether
the government has substantially burdened religious exercise ..., not
whether the ... claimant is able to engage in other forms of religious
exercise.”137 For a prisoner who wanted to grow a half-inch beard for
religious reasons, being provided a prayer rug and special meals did
not adequately protect his religious liberty, said the Court.138
Similarly in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,139 perhaps the
most important recent RFRA case, the government had suggested
that a business that had religious scruples about providing its em-
ployees health insurance with contraception coverage could avoid
the burden on its religious beliefs by dropping the insurance al-
together and paying the Affordable Care Act’s fines.140 Though this
alternative might even have saved Hobby Lobby money, the Su-
preme Court held that this did not eliminate the burden, because it
ignored the fact that companies may “have religious reasons for
providing health-insurance coverage for their employees.”141
The lesson is that not all alternatives are equal from a religious
perspective—and it is up to plaintiffs, not the courts, to decide what
courses of action accord with their religious beliefs.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012); see also id. § 2000bb-2(4) (2012) (incorporating
RLUIPA’s definition into RFRA).
135. Henderson, 265 F.3d at 1074.
136. See infra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
137. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (discussing substantial burden under
RLUIPA).
138. Id.
139. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
140. Id. at 2776.
141. Id.
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Consider, in this regard, the alternative to the one-year MSM de-
ferral, discussed above, that has been used in France and Israel.142
Because this alternative involves freezing and quarantining the
donation until the donor returns for a second test, the method is
only practical for plasma, which has a longer shelf life than whole
blood.143 Would our religious gay blood donor feel that he was suit-
ably exercising his religion if he were only allowed to give plasma?
Is the method used in France a possible less-restrictive alternative
to the American system, or is it itself a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a would-be blood donor?
Here it would presumably be up to the donor to decide. But were
he to say that he would only be satisfied by donating whole blood,
it is easy to imagine a court struggling to find that the burden on his
religious exercise was substantial.144 The temptation to judge the
importance of a religious practice, as the Henderson court did with
the evangelical t-shirt sellers,145 would be strong. Some practices
might just seem too marginal to protect. But who is to judge?
2. The MSM Blood Ban Is Not a Substantial Burden on
Religion Because Donating Blood Is a Marginal Religious
Practice
One of the most hotly contested questions about RFRA since
Hobby Lobby asks how, and to what extent, courts can judge for
themselves what counts as a substantial burden on religion.146 Most
142. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Deference to Claims of Substantial Religious Burden,
2016 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 10, 13 (arguing against automatic deference to religious objectors
claiming a substantial burden on their religious exercise); Chad Flanders, Substantial
Confusion About “Substantial Burdens,” 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 27, 27, 32 (providing a
primer on what constitutes a substantial burden and arguing that courts should focus on the
compelling interest prong); Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens: How Courts May
(and Why They Must) Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 94, 97
(2017) (“Courts and commentators are divided over the correctness and wisdom of this
limitation on judicial review.”); Kent Greenawalt, Hobby Lobby: Its Flawed Interpretive
Techniques and Standards of Application, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 153, 155 (2015)
(asserting that Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Hobby Lobby was “excessively formalistic”);
Abner S. Greene, A Secular Test for a Secular Statute, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 34, 36
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recently, this has arisen in the context of complicity claims, as when
Hobby Lobby claimed that providing insurance with contraception
coverage facilitated abortion;147 in the Little Sisters of the Poor’s
claim that notifying the Department of Health and Human Services
of its religious objection to the contraception mandate triggered
alternate coverage, and thus facilitated abortion;148 or in a baker’s
claim that designing a cake for a same-sex wedding constituted
participation in, and endorsement of, the wedding.149
In Hobby Lobby, the government (and Justice Ginsburg, in
dissent) found the link between an employer’s provision of insur-
ance with contraception coverage and abortion to be too attenuat-
ed to count as a substantial burden on the employer’s religion.150
According to the Hobby Lobby majority, however, to say this was to
call the employer’s religious belief—the belief that providing the
insurance made it morally complicit in abortion—unreasonable.151
And as one scholar wrote in Hobby Lobby’s wake, “Courts lack the
tools to engage in line drawing when it comes to determining and
(arguing that the Court should have applied an objective test to determine whether the law
substantially burdened claimant’s religious exercise in Hobby Lobby); Helfand, supra note
112, at 3 (proposing that courts should “only allow a RFRA claim to go forward after” first
identifying that the burden is indeed substantial); Amy J. Sepinwall, Burdening “Substantial
Burdens,” 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 43, 52 (contending that the Court should recognize that
an accommodations process such as the one in Zubik imposes a substantial burden because
it requires employers to ratify contraceptive use); Elizabeth Sepper, Substantiating the Bur-
dens of Compliance, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 54 (arguing that courts should not defer
to religious objectors in deciding what constitutes a substantial burden).
147. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014); see NeJaime &
Siegel, supra note 128, at 2524-29 (differentiating complicity-based claims such as those in
Hobby Lobby from the paradigmatic free exercise claims Congress had in mind when it pass-
ed RFRA).
148. See Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1167-68
(10th Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded by Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); see also
Gedicks, supra note 146, at 100 (“One need not question the Little Sisters’ sincerity ... to
wonder whether the burden they claimed should count as ‘substantial’ under RFRA. At the
least, a court should review this claim that the hypothetical voluntary action of a third party
can ‘substantially burden’ a RFRA claimant’s religious exercise when the claimant is legally
empowered to prevent the action that would constitute the burden.”).
149. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (No. 16-111), 2016 WL 3971309, at *11.
150. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2777; id. at 2797-99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
151. See id. at 2778 (majority opinion).
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calibrating the degree of theological impact a particular law imposes
on religion.”152
Writing in dissent, Judge Ginsburg accused the Hobby Lobby
majority of conflating sincerity with substantial burdens.153 What
counts among the latter, she argued, is a question for the law to
answer; it does not depend (solely) on what a religious adherent
believes.154 Were it otherwise, RFRA would trigger strict scrutiny
anytime a plaintiff sincerely claimed that it should.155 Matters that
people “care a great deal about” might end up giving rise to RFRA
claims, as Professor Kent Greenawalt has put it, “even when they
think the religious implications of the behavior are minor.”156
The question is whether there is an objective standard that courts
can apply in deciding whether a burden is substantial, or whether
they must rely instead on the subjective understanding of those
making religious exemption claims.157 In situations such as those in
Hobby Lobby and Little Sisters of the Poor, some scholars have sug-
gested that courts should rely on secular, common law principles
from tort law or elsewhere to decide when causation (the link be-
tween the plaintiffs’ acts and the harm feared) is tight enough to
152. Michael A. Helfand, Identifying Substantial Burdens, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1771, 1788.
153. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Gedicks, supra
note 146, at 102 (“This confuses the question whether a RFRA claimant correctly understands
his or her religion (which courts may not address), with the question whether the claimant
has satisfied statutory or other legal requirements for exemption (the adjudication of which
has always been an essential feature of the Court’s exemption jurisprudence).”).
154. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2798-99.
155. See Gedicks, supra note 146, at 98 (“If judicial review is confined to claimant sincerity
and secular costs, the substantiality of a claimed religious burden under RFRA is effectively
established by the claimant’s mere say-so.”); Martin S. Lederman, Reconstructing RFRA: The
Contested Legacy of Religious Freedom Restoration, 125 YALE L.J.F. 416, 426 (2016) (“The
RFRA claimants’ very framing of their alleged religious obligations therefore might be
sufficient to clear the RFRA hurdle of showing a ‘substantial burden’ on their exercise of
religion.”).
156. 1 GREENAWALT, supra note 109, at 209 (offering the example of spending time with
one’s family on Saturdays); see also Gedicks, supra note 146, at 123 (“Believers seeking RFRA
exemptions have every incentive to draw the boundary between ‘substantial’ and ‘insub-
stantial’ burdens so as to insulate the maximum amount of their activities from legal lia-
bility.”).
157. Cf. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1739-40
(2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“It is no more appropriate for the United States Supreme
Court to tell Mr. Phillips that a wedding cake is just like any other—without regard to the
religious significance his faith may attach to it—than it would be for the Court to suggest that
for all persons sacramental bread is just bread or a kippah is just a cap.”).
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make those seeking an exemption responsible, and thus substan-
tially burdened, in a legal sense rather than a religious one.158
As applied to blood donations, an objective test would have to be
somewhat different. After all, the aspiring gay blood donor is not
worried about complicity with evil, however attenuated. His worry
is about being prevented from carrying out what he claims to be an
important act of religious charity. The question here—if it is one a
court can legitimately ask—is whether his charitable act is a non-
trivial form of religious exercise. To determine this, courts might
look at the prevalence of such charitable acts within a particular
faith community, or within the life of the individual. Professor
Greenawalt suggests in this context that activities such as serving
the poor may be more substantial to the Salvation Army than to a
typical church.159
I have my doubts about whether this can be done without asking
what is “compelled by, or central to, a system of religious be-
lief”160—the very inquiry that amendments to RFRA have now made
irrelevant.161 But perhaps the amendments meant only what they
say: that, to be protected, a religious practice need not be central.162
It might still need to be important, or nontrivial. 
The crucial point here is that the religious gay blood donor can
only lose on the substantial burden prong of his RFRA challenge if
a court were to independently judge his blood donations as somehow
unimportant. But to do this, they would have to turn back from the
deference to plaintiffs that makes cases such as Hobby Lobby such
a potential threat to the rule of law.163
158. See, e.g., Gedicks, supra note 146, at 132 (drawing on tort law); see also Greene, supra
note 146, at 39-40 (drawing on other areas of First Amendment doctrine). For an important
recent discussion of the question, in which the Sixth Circuit refused to defer to the defendant’s
own perception of what burdens are substantial, see EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 589-90 (6th Cir. 2018).
159. See 1 GREENAWALT, supra note 109, at 213.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012).
161. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 151 and accompanying text; see also Gedicks, supra note 146, at 100-01
(“[E]xemption boundaries must be tended by courts, not exemption beneficiaries, lest the rule
of law be swallowed by a sea of self-interested yet functionally unreviewable exemption
claims.”).
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3. The FDA Has a Compelling Interest in Maintaining a
Uniform System for Blood Donations
Even if our plaintiff shows that the MSM blood ban substantially
burdens his exercise of religion, he would still lose if the government
can show that the ban is the least restrictive means of pursuing a
compelling governmental interest.164 Here, the government’s prin-
cipal interest is protecting the public health by ensuring the safety
of the blood supply,165 and I will return shortly to the question of
whether the MSM ban is the least restrictive means of doing so.
But another compelling interest that the government might as-
sert is maintaining a uniform national system for blood donations.
In fact, it has relied on analogous arguments for uniformity in many
of the Free Exercise and RFRA claims brought against it over the
years.166 The problem is, the government has lost these arguments,
at least in more recent cases.167
In O Centro, the Supreme Court’s 2006 RFRA case about a re-
ligious sect’s sacramental use of an illegal hallucinogenic tea, the
federal government argued “that the effectiveness of the Controlled
Substances Act will be ‘necessarily ... undercut’ if the Act is not
uniformly applied.”168 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts
was unconvinced.169 He noted that other exceptions to federal drug
laws—most importantly, the congressionally authorized exemption
164. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
423, 438 (2006) (rejecting the government’s argument that it has a compelling interest in
uniform application of the Controlled Substances Act with regard to hoasca); Emp’t Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885, 890 (1990) (accepting Oregon’s argument that granting an exception
for religious peyote would erode its interest in the uniform enforcement of its drug laws);
Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989) (accepting the government’s argument
that it could not grant a tax deduction for religious “auditing” sessions because it has a
compelling interest in maintaining a uniform tax system); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
258-61 (1982) (rejecting an Amish taxpayer’s claim that the Free Exercise Clause commanded
his exemption from Social Security tax obligations because the government has an interest
in applying tax laws uniformly); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608-09 (1961) (rejecting
petitioners’ argument that a statute proscribing retail sale of certain commodities on Sunday
interfered with the free exercise of their Jewish religion and noting that the state has an
interest in eliminating commercial noise and activity).
167. See O Centro, 546 U.S. at 434-37.
168. Id. at 434 (internal citation omitted).
169. See id. at 423.
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for Indian tribes to use peyote170—had not undermined the Act as a
whole.171 And he distinguished the exemption sought in O Centro
from those cases in which any exemption would work against the
purpose of the law itself.172 For example, the purpose of a uni-
form day of rest—the Sunday closing law at issue in Braunfeld v.
Brown—was to avoid the very competitive advantage that the plain-
tiff in that case would have gained had he been allowed to open on
Sunday and close instead on Saturday.173
Viewed against this distinction, the challenge to the FDA’s blood
donation policy looks secure. Uniformity is a strange claim to make
for a regulation that treats so many groups so differently.174 Unlike
opening a store on what would otherwise be the uniform day of rest,
allowing an HIV-negative gay man to donate blood does nothing to
undermine the FDA’s goals. Of course, allowing donations from a
gay man whose HIV status is unknown might endanger the safety
of the blood supply. But that just means that whatever accommoda-
tion the plaintiff requests needs to be one that avoids introducing
undue risk.175 It does not mean that the system needs to be uni-
form—which it certainly is not now.176
As the Court said in O Centro, the government’s insistence on
uniformity really amounts to a slippery-slope argument that “echoes
the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an
exception for you, I’ll have to make one for everybody, so no ex-
ceptions.”177 But RFRA mandates exceptions.178 In Chief Justice
Roberts’s words, “that is how the law works.”179 If our plaintiff were
to win his RFRA suit against the FDA, many others would surely
170. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2012).
171. See O Centro, 546 U.S. at 434-37.
172. See id. at 435-37.
173. See 366 U.S. 599, 608-09 (1961); see also O Centro, 546 U.S. at 435-37 (distinguishing
O Centro from Braunfeld).
174. See supra Part I.
175. See United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1062 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Supreme
Court vindicated free exercise claims in cases like Yoder, O Centro, and Hobby Lobby only be-
cause it was convinced that, on the facts before it, the government could very likely achieve
all of its compelling interests without insisting that the religious objectors comply with the
relevant laws in full.”).
176. See supra Part I.
177. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 436.
178. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2012)).
179. Id. at 434.
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follow, and the logistical problems would multiply (unless the FDA
came up with a more categorical solution, such as reducing or elim-
inating the MSM deferral period for everyone). Problems of admin-
istrability, however, are exactly what O Centro shunts aside.180 
For a court to find against our plaintiff, then, it would need to
pull back from O Centro and begin to treat uniformity, in the sense
of administrative feasibility, as a governmental interest worth
giving more weight. In this regard, it is worth considering United
States v. Lee, a 1982 case brought by Amish employers opposed to
Social Security taxes.181 Summarizing Lee, the O Centro Court as-
serted that mandatory participation “is indispensable to the fiscal
vitality of the social security system”182—a claim that is surely
overstated, given the fact that Congress carved out its own exemp-
tion in 1988.183 The Lee Court’s actual worry was that “it would be
difficult to accommodate the comprehensive social security system
with myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious
beliefs.”184 Its worry was about administrability.
Allowing such a worry to factor into the RFRA calculus would
work against our gay blood donor, but it might protect gay rights
elsewhere. Consider claims by bakers, florists, photographers, inn-
keepers, and other business owners who want exemptions from
public accommodations laws that prohibit discrimination based on
sexual orientation.185 Often these exemptions are defended more
180. See id. (“RFRA makes clear that it is the obligation of the courts to consider whether
exceptions are required under the test set forth by Congress.”); cf. Christie, 825 F.3d at 1060
(“The government may well be right that granting an exception to the Christies would invite
a flood of RFRA claims, perhaps for distribution of cocaine and heroin. But that objection is
insufficient, for it is nothing more than a ‘slippery-slope concern[ ] that could be invoked in
response to any RFRA claim.’” (quoting O Centro, 546 U.S. at 435-36)).
181. 455 U.S. 252, 254-55 (1982); see also Greenawalt, supra note 146, at 170-71 (arguing
that Lee is difficult to distinguish from Hobby Lobby).
182. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 435 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 258).
183. See Lederman, supra note 155, at 439-40 (citing Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3781
(1988) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3127 (2012))).
184. Lee, 455 U.S. at 259-60.
185. See, e.g., Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (mem.) (florist),
vacating and remanding in State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017);
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (cake baker);
Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. Miller, No. BCV-17-102855, 2018 WL 747835 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Feb. 5, 2018) (another cake baker); Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, No. 11-1-3103-12 ECN,
2013 WL 1614105 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Apr. 11, 2013) (bed and breakfast); Elane Photography, LLC
v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (wedding photographer).
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vigorously in places where there is market competition and a gay
couple could easily find another baker or florist.186 But making ex-
emptions hinge on a vendor’s market power obviously complicates
the administration of antidiscrimination law in profound ways.187
Factoring in such administrability problems could make it less like-
ly that courts would allow exemptions to antidiscrimination laws.
And given that the Hobby Lobby Court only explicitly protected race
discrimination laws from religious exemptions,188 antidiscrimination
laws protecting gays and lesbians may need the help.189
4. The MSM Ban Is the Least Restrictive Means Available
Because Other Alternatives Would Cost More
The final two ways that the religious gay plaintiff could lose are
probably the most likely, and likely the most important. Both in-
volve scenarios in which courts find that the one-year MSM deferral
substantially burdens the plaintiff ’s religious exercise, but then
find, for one reason or another, that no less restrictive means are
available to ensure the safety of the blood supply.190
I say that these are probably the most likely ways that the
plaintiff might lose, because courts may well be wary of substituting
their own judgment about public health for that of the “Interagency
186. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange Land: The
Case for Reciprocal Accommodation of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same-Sex Couples
To Marry, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 389, 419 (2010) (discussing the same argument in context of
rental agreements).
187. See id. at 417-21.
188. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014) (“The Gov-
ernment has a compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the
workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely
tailored to achieve that critical goal.”).
189. Cf. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (“The outcome of cases like this in
other circumstances must await further elaboration in the courts, all in the context of recog-
nizing that these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to
sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek
goods and services in an open market.”).
190. “At a minimum, the government must address those alternatives of which it has
become aware during the course of this litigation.... The government must show that each
proposed alternative either is not ‘le[ss] restrictive’ within the meaning of RFRA, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-1(b)(2), or is not plausibly capable of allowing the government to achieve all of its
compelling interests.” United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1061 (9th Cir. 2016)
(alteration in original).
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Blood, Organ & Tissue Safety Working Group on MSM, consisting
of representatives from the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention, Health Resources and Services Administration, National
Institutes of Health, HHS Office of Civil Rights, Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Health, and FDA”—the group responsible
for the most recently amended MSM policy in 2015.191 Claims by the
government that changes to its current policy would increase either
costs or risks are thus likely to give courts pause.
At the same time, I say that these are likely the most important
parts of this case—even, or especially, if the plaintiff loses—because
the Supreme Court’s reading of RFRA’s least restrictive means
requirement is one of the biggest and, to progressives, most con-
cerning changes in recent religious liberty case law. As Professor
Marty Lederman has observed, before RFRA came along, “the gov-
ernment almost always prevailed, notwithstanding the Court’s use
of the language of so-called ‘strict scrutiny.’”192 More specifically,
quoting Professor Lederman again:
Two aspects of this [earlier] version of the “least restrictive
means” test are especially germane to the current RFRA
disputes. First, ... the Court has denied religious exemptions
where they would impose harms on third parties. Second, the
Court has never required the government to adopt a proposed
alternative means of furthering its compelling interests if it
would require enactment of a new statute—especially an
additional appropriation—in order to ameliorate the impact of
religious exemptions on compelling government interests.193
In other words, the possibilities that a religious exemption would
increase costs or impose harm on third parties are not just the final
two ways our plaintiff could lose—they are ways he almost surely
191. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 3 (acronyms omitted).
192. Lederman, supra note 155, at 431 (citing Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (1990) (“At the Supreme
Court level, the free exercise compelling interest test was a Potemkin doctrine.”)); see also
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1994)
(describing the pre-Smith doctrine as “strict in theory but feeble in fact”); Ira C. Lupu, The
Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 756 (1992) (describing the standard
of review as “strict in theory, but ever-so-gentle in fact”).
193. Lederman, supra note 155, at 435.
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would have lost until very recent times. And yet they did not cause
Hobby Lobby194 to lose, and Arlene’s Flowers and other religious
objectors to same-sex marriage might not either.195 Much, then, is
at stake.
Two doctrinal points before plunging forward. First, “the ‘least
restrictive means’ test calls for a comparative analysis,” pitting the
government’s preferred means against “those alternatives of which
it has become aware during the course of [the] litigation.”196 The
government wins if it shows “that each proposed alternative ... is not
plausibly capable of allowing the government to achieve all of its
compelling interests.”197 Second, these compelling interests cannot
be formulated in overly broad terms. Courts are to “scrutiniz[e] the
asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious
claimants and to look to the marginal interest in enforcing the
challenged government action in that particular context.”198
Turning back to the blood ban with those points in mind, the
problem of increased costs is easy to state. Among the alternatives
that our religious gay plaintiff might offer, several would probably
be more expensive than the current system. Telling gay men before
they donate, or even before they show up, that they cannot give
blood if they have had sex with another man in the last year is a
low-cost prophylactic. (That said, the true costs have to include the
blood donations unnecessarily lost because of the FDA’s over-
inclusive deferral policy.199) Switching from a blanket deferral to
individualized risk screening would require more highly trained
screeners at blood donation sites.200 Similarly, freezing and quaran-
194. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (mem.), vacating
and remanding in State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017).
196. United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1061 (9th Cir. 2016).
197. Id.
198. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 863 (2015) (alteration in original) (internal quotations
omitted).
199. See supra notes 46, 48 and accompanying text. The Williams Institute has estimated
that removing the current deferral period could lead to almost 300,000 additional pints of
donated blood per year. See AYOKO MIYASHITA & GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INST., UPDATE:
EFFECTS OF LIFTING BLOOD DONATION BANS ON MEN WHO HAVE SEX WITH MEN 2 tbl.2 (2014),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Blood-Ban-update-Jan-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NU8F-WHJJ].
200. See Sacks et al., supra note 26, at 176 (“A policy change will require commitment,
persistence, and political will.”). 
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tining plasma donations until the donor returns for a second blood
test would impose both storage costs and the costs of a second visit
and HIV test.201 A competing approach—treating blood components
with pathogen inactivation technologies—would also be expensive:
currently around “$100 to $165 per unit.”202
The question is: Do these alternatives count as less restrictive
means of furthering the government’s compelling interest in public
health if they do so at greater cost than the current system? It is one
thing, after all, to say that Native Americans can use peyote203 or a
prisoner can grow a short beard204 for religious purposes, while
others cannot. Neither exemption requires the government to fund
anything; the government merely limits the reach of a program or
policy already in place.
Hobby Lobby offers a more relevant case. There Justice Alito,
writing for the majority, claimed that the “most straightforward
way” for the government to protect Hobby Lobby’s religious liberty
would be for the government itself to pay for the employees’ con-
traception coverage.205 The government, he said, had failed to show
that “this [was] not a viable alternative,”206 and despite its claims
that “RFRA cannot be used to require creation of entirely new pro-
grams,”207 Justice Alito refused to draw a line between creating new
programs and modifying existing ones.208 The government’s refusal
“to spend even a small amount reflects a judgment about the im-
portance of religious liberty that was not shared by the Congress
201. See Joseph B. Babigumira et al., Cost-Utility and Budget Impact of Methylene Blue-
Treated Plasma Compared to Quarantine Plasma, 16 BLOOD TRANSFUSION 154, 154-55 (2018),
http://www.bloodtransfusion.it/articolo.aspx?idart=003129&idriv=000130 [https://perma.cc/
RQ6R-TWD7].
202. See Kathryn E. Webert et al., Proceedings of a Consensus Conference: Pathogen
Inactivation—Making Decisions About New Technologies, 22 TRANSFUSION MED. REV. 1, 18
(2008).
203. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2012).
204. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859, 867 (2015).
205. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014).
206. Id.; see also Lederman, supra note 155, at 427 (“Justice Alito went so far as to suggest
that if Congress might conceivably appropriate new funds to compensate for the harms that
a religious exemption would visit upon third parties, the possibility of such a new appro-
priations statute—no matter how unlikely—could be ‘a viable alternative,’ and thus a less
restrictive means of advancing the government’s interests, thereby requiring conferral of the
RFRA exemptions.” (quoting Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780)).
207. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781.
208. See id.
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that enacted” RFRA, Alito wrote, citing a provision in RLUIPA
which acknowledges that it “may require a government to incur
expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial
burden on religious exercise.”209 In the end, incurring these costs
was not necessary in Hobby Lobby, for another accommodation, al-
ready offered to nonprofits, relied on insurers to provide contracep-
tion coverage through separate plans.210
Dissenting, Justice Ginsburg was concerned enough about the
majority’s bypassed “‘let the government pay’ alternative”211 that
she marshalled a parade of horribles anyway:
Suppose an employer’s sincerely held religious belief is offended
by health coverage of vaccines, or paying the minimum wage, or
according women equal pay for substantially similar work? Does
it rank as a less restrictive alternative to require the govern-
ment to provide the money or benefit to which the employer has
a religion-based objection?212
If someone seeking a religious exemption will get it anytime the
government is able to pick up the tab—and when will it not be?213—
the least restrictive alternative test becomes meaningless in many
cases. Either this will benefit the gay blood donor—whose quaran-
tined or pathogen inactivated plasma donation would be subsidized
by the government214—or it will not. But if the latter, the Court
would need to back away from the largesse suggested by at least
four Justices in cases such as Hobby Lobby.
209. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-3(c) (2012)).
210. Id. at 2782. Justice Kennedy, who joined the Hobby Lobby majority, emphasized this
point in his concurring opinion: “In these cases, it is the Court’s understanding that an accom-
modation may be made to the employers without imposition of a whole new program or bur-
den on the Government.” Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
211. Id. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (citations omitted).
213. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 278 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (“After all, at
each step, as the majority seems to feel, the issue is only one of weighing the government's
pocketbook against the actual survival of the recipient, and surely that balance must always
tip in favor of the individual.”).
214. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
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5. The MSM Ban Is the Least Restrictive Means Available
Because Other Alternatives Would Burden Third Parties
In Hobby Lobby, one of the chief disagreements between Justices
Alito and Ginsburg centered on whether RFRA allows for religious
exemptions that burden third parties—people who do not share the
plaintiff ’s religious beliefs. “No tradition, and no prior decision un-
der RFRA,” wrote Justice Ginsburg, “allows a religion-based exemp-
tion when the accommodation would be harmful to others—here, the
very persons the contraceptive coverage requirement was designed
to protect.”215 In Hobby Lobby, the third parties potentially bearing
the cost of the company’s exemption from the contraception mandate
were its female employees, who would no longer be entitled to in-
sured contraception through their workplace insurance policies.216
Justice Alito was unswayed: “Nothing in the text of RFRA or its
basic purposes supports giving the Government an entirely free
hand to impose burdens on religious exercise so long as those bur-
dens confer a benefit on other individuals.”217 Third-party harms
must be factored into the “less restrictive means” calculus, he said,
but they cannot foreclose a RFRA exemption.218
Ultimately, the Hobby Lobby majority was able to sidestep the
question, as it assumed that cost-free contraception could be pro-
vided even if a RFRA exemption were granted.219 The Court as-
sumed no third-party harm, in other words. In fact, this absence of
third-party harm seems to have determined Justice Kennedy’s vote
and was the central focus of his concurring opinion.220 Hobby Lobby
215. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
216. But see id. at 2782 (majority opinion) (“The principal dissent identifies no reason why
this accommodation would fail to protect the asserted needs of women as effectively as the
contraceptive mandate, and there is none. Under the accommodation, the plaintiffs’ female
employees would continue to receive contraceptive coverage without cost sharing for all FDA-
approved contraceptives, and they would continue to face minimal logistical and admini-
strative obstacles.” (internal quotation and footnote omitted)).
217. Id. at 2781 n.37.
218. See id.
219. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
220. Although Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion, he also wrote separately to
stress that religious exercise cannot “unduly restrict other persons, such as employees, in
protecting their own interests.” Hobby Lobby , 134 S. Ct. at 2785-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring);
see also NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 128, at 2530-32 (“Justice Kennedy appears to have
guided the Court to a decision that endeavored to vindicate both the interests of the claimants
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thus leaves for another day—now, a day without Justice Kennedy—
the crucial question of whether a religious exemption can impose
burdens on third parties.
This debate has continued since Hobby Lobby. In the Court’s
unanimous decision in Holt v. Hobbs, for example, Justice Ginsburg
added a two-sentence concurrence making clear that she had voted
to allow a Muslim prisoner to grow a short beard—in violation of
prison rules—because, unlike the exemption in Hobby Lobby, “ac-
commodating petitioner’s religious belief in this case would not
detrimentally affect others who do not share petitioner’s belief.”221
In the context of the blood ban, the possibility of third-party
harms depends once again on the specific accommodation being
proposed. Imagine, for example, a gay plaintiff who demanded no
deferral period at all, no matter how many sexual partners he had
recently had, or what protection he had used. This, of course, is
nothing but the FDA’s current policy for straight men.222 Such an
accommodation would increase, however marginally, the risk that
HIV will be transmitted through the blood supply.223 To force third
parties—here, recipients of blood transfusions and other blood prod-
ucts—to accept a greater risk of contracting HIV is to make them
shoulder the cost of the gay blood donor’s religious exercise. And
when the government causes one person to pay for another person’s
religious practices, concerns may arise under the Establishment
Clause.224
seeking religious exemptions and of the government in enforcing the statute.”).
221. 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
222. Cf. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 14-15.
223. See Marc Germain, The Risk of Allowing Blood Donation from Men Having Sex with
Men After a Temporary Deferral: Predictions Versus Reality, 56 TRANSFUSION 1603, 1603-04
(2016).
224. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from
the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 343, 375 (2014); Micah Schwartzman et al., The Costs of Conscience, 106 KY. L.J.
881, 888-94 (2017-2018). But see Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Accommodations and Third-
Party Harms: Constitutional Values and Limits, 106 KY. L.J. 717 (2018) (denying that the
Establishment Clause prohibits all third-party harms, but arguing that harms imposed on
marginalized groups should not be allowed); Mark Storslee, Religious Accommodation, The
Establishment Clause, and Third-Party Harm, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=3136753 [https://perma.cc/3CJ4-F5GP] (arguing that the Establishment
Clause does not bar all third-party costs or harms, but only governmental attempts to foster
religious conformity).
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It is unlikely that our religious gay blood donor would propose
such a comparatively risky alternative to the current one-year MSM
deferral. Indeed, some of the alternatives he might propose instead
would actually reduce the risk of HIV transmission. Double testing
both before and after the window period, for example, would vir-
tually guarantee the safety of his donation.225 This method would be
far less risky than relying on donors to accurately remember and
report their own sexual history, as the current system does.226 
Some alternatives, however, would potentially increase risk, even
if minimally.227 Reducing the deferral period from a year to six
months, or even three, might have no effect, or it might have a small
one;228 this is a factual finding that would have to be litigated. This
is similarly true for a change that would replace a standardized
deferral period with an individualized risk analysis.229
The question is whether courts would refuse to accept any pro-
posed alternative that had even a small predicted increase in risk.
If strict scrutiny were to have zero tolerance for increased risk, sev-
eral of plaintiff ’s proposed accommodations would get rejected.
To take this course, however, would require courts to say that
third-party harms, at least of this kind, are never acceptable. But
what would count as “of this kind”? Burdens that involve the health
of third parties? The exemption in Hobby Lobby surely had the po-
tential to do that.230 If any fewer women got access to contraception
225. See CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RES., supra note 1, at 9.
226. See id. at 5. When it revised its MSM policy in 2015, the FDA claimed that non-
compliance with its lifetime deferral had been on the rise: “the percentage of male donors
estimated to be MSM has risen from 0.6% in 1993, to 1.2% in 1998, and to 2.6% in 2013.” Id.
at 9.
227. As to this issue, the blood ban case would resemble cases involving military draft
exemptions, in which the third-party harm—the chance of getting drafted in place of a
conscientious objector—is generally “small and diffuse.” See Schwartzman et al., supra note
224, at 904.
228. See CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RES., supra note 1, at 10-11.
229. See id. at 7, 10.
230. The Hobby Lobby Court did try to distinguish other particular public health risks:
“[O]ur decision in these cases is concerned solely with the contraceptive mandate.... Other
coverage requirements, such as immunizations, may be supported by different interests (for
example, the need to combat the spread of infectious diseases) and may involve different
arguments about the least restrictive means of providing them.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014). But the fact that immunizations are needed to
produce valuable herd effects means that very different considerations will arise there than
in the blood ban or contraception insurance contexts.
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under the alternative plan—even if only because of increased lo-
gistic hassles—this could affect their health.231 The increased risk
might be small, but so is a shortened deferral period in the blood
donation context.232 Rejecting the slight possibility of third-party
harm in the latter case would thus require the Court to qualify (and
maybe quantify) its willingness to allow such harm in the former
case. And this could have huge implications for cases to come.
In particular, reduced tolerance for exemptions that impose third-
party costs could reshape current debates over religious exemptions
to antidiscrimination laws, especially public accommodation laws
that protect gays and lesbians.233 Granting bakers, florists, photog-
raphers, innkeepers, and other businesspeople the religious liberty
to refuse their services to gay couples comes at a cost—one borne
entirely by the gay couples themselves.234 The cost includes the dig-
nitary harms the couples experience when they are turned away
from a business that otherwise holds itself open to the public.235 And
it also includes the time it takes the couples to find other vendors,
and the possibility that those other vendors might not be as desir-
able as the ones they went to first.236
Here again, then, the religious gay blood donor presents courts a
choice. The interpretation of RFRA that has allowed conservative
religious claimants to prevail in recent cases should allow our
plaintiff to get a religious exemption as well.237 But if courts find
instead that the risk to third parties is too great—that the costs of
our plaintiff’s religious exercise should not be transferred to
others—then they will need to narrow the expansive readings of
231. See id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
232. See CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RES., supra note 1, at 10-11.
233. See Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars in Transnational Perspective:
Religious Liberty, Third-Party Harm, and Pluralism, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING
THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY 187, 190 (Susanna Mancini &
Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2018) (“[C]oncerns about the third-party harms of accommodation are
especially acute in culture war contexts, when religious exemption claims are employed, not
to protect the practice of minority faiths that may have been overlooked by lawmakers, but
instead to extend conflict over matters in society-wide contest. The accommodation of these
claims may become a vehicle for opposing emergent legal orders and for limiting the newly
recognized rights of those they protect.”).
234. See cases cited supra note 185.
235. See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 186, at 419-20.
236. See id. at 418-21.
237. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014).
2019] THE CASE OF THE RELIGIOUS GAY BLOOD DONOR 1935
RFRA that religious conservatives are currently relying on in their
public accommodation cases.238 As I said at the outset: heads, gay
rights advocates win; tails, religious conservatives lose.
IV. WHY DOES THIS CASE NOT EXIST?
So why have gay rights advocates not tossed this coin? I have
argued, after all, that advocates for gay rights have something to
win no matter how the case turns out. And simply bringing the
case has the potential to disrupt stereotypes: those that pit gay
rights against religion, dismiss religious freedom as a purely con-
servative cause, associate gay men and disease, or paint gay rights
claims as graspingly self-centered. The question, then, is why this
case has never been brought.
Maybe it is because the idea here is just so original. Maybe the
standard law review claim—“This article is the first to ...”—is ac-
tually true here,239 and litigators just have not considered RFRA as
a way to combat the MSM ban. I am skeptical, however. For one
thing, progressive litigators have brought RFRA claims in service of
“liberal” causes in recent times. One of the suits against the Trump
Administration’s travel ban included a RFRA claim,240 though it
never got much attention.241 Even more telling is the fact that gay
238. See cases cited supra note 185.
239. See, e.g., Carol Sanger, The Lopsided Harms of Reproductive Negligence, 118 COLUM.
L. REV. ONLINE 29, 35 (2017) (“[F]ew scholarly papers these days, especially by junior
scholars, fail to announce themselves as the first to have thought the subject up.”). Fittingly,
Professor Sanger’s claim was not itself the first on the subject. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, The
Modern Plague of the Law Review Process: The Originality Graf, PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 22,
2012, 12:41 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/01/the-modern-plague-of-
the-law-review-process-the-originality-graf.html [https://perma.cc/83DU-68AB] (expressing
a desire for law review authors to “tone down” their tendency to act as though they are the
“first” to consider an argument); see also Paul Horwitz, Three More Takes on Novelty Claims
in Legal Scholarship, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 19, 2013, 11:51 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2013/08/three-more-takes-on-novelty-claims-in-legal-scholarship.html [https://
perma.cc/9K7Z-5HV5] (opining that it is “self-destructive ... and gauche” for a law review
author to say that she is making an unoriginal argument, even if somewhat true).
240. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 544 (D. Md. 2017).
241. The Fourth Circuit ignored the RFRA claim in the various Travel Ban appeals that
it considered. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 579 (4th Cir. 2017)
(ignoring RFRA claim because the District Court based its injunction “in its entirety ... solely
on Plaintiff ’s Establishment Clause claim”), vacated as moot Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assis-
tance, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.). A few bloggers and news outlets noted the claim,
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rights advocates have not even brought an equal protection suit
against the MSM ban, though this approach has long been discussed
in academic literature.242 Advocates working in this area certainly
understand what such a suit would look like, but they have decided
to oppose the MSM ban in other ways instead.243 This suggests that
reasons beyond simply not having thought about RFRA may have
kept advocates from bringing the suit I have described.
One reason may be that the health risks involved here are real,
even if small,244 and so is the possibility of backlash if a gay blood
donor were to cause a transfusion recipient to contract HIV. Risk
models predict that, at present, “approximately 11 infectious dona-
however. See, e.g., Corey Brettschneider, Why Trump’s Immigration Rules Are Unconstitu-
tional, POLITICO (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/02/why-trumps-
immigration-rules-are-unconstitutional-214722 [https://perma.cc/C7WX-EZTK]; Sunnivie
Brydum, Irony Watch: Trump’s Travel Ban Violates Religious Freedom Act According to ACLU
Lawsuit, RELIGION DISPATCHES (Feb. 9, 2017), http://religiondispatches.org/trumps-travel-ban-
violates-religious-freedom-act-aclu-lawsuit-alleges/ [https://perma.cc/ZST6-S5PV]; Nelson
Tebbe et al., How Trump’s Executive Order on Immigration Violates Religious Freedom Laws,
JUST SECURITY (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/37061/trumps-executive-order-
immigration-violates-religious-freedom-laws/ [https://perma.cc/358Y-3N5Q]. More recently,
two student authors have written Notes that thoughtfully explore potential applications of
RFRA in the context of immigration and the sanctuary movement. See generally Thomas
Scott-Railton, Note, A Legal Sanctuary: How the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Could
Protect Sanctuary Churches, 128 YALE L.J. 408 (2018); Laura Keeley, Note, Religious Liberty,
Sanctuary, and Unintended Consequences for Reproductive and LGBTQ Rights, COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. (forthcoming) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3156511) [https://perma.cc/ZJ29-X366]. These ideas are currently being tested in a crim-
inal case against a man who provides food, water, and clothing to migrants in the Arizona
desert. See Brief of and by Professors of Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Warren, No. CR-18-00223-001-TUC-RCC (D.
Ariz. June 21, 2018).
242. See sources cited supra note 11.
243. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, FDA Fails to Adequately Address
Discriminatory Blood Donation Ban (Dec. 23, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/news/fda-fails-
adequately-address-discriminatory-blood-donation-ban [https://perma.cc/3E56-AM33]
(describing comments the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has submitted to the FDA
regarding the MSM ban); Scott Schoettes, The FDA (Finally) Opens the Door to a More
Enlightened Blood Donation Policy, LAMBDA LEGAL (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.lambdalegal.
org/blog/20160802_fda-finally-opens-door-blood-donation-policy [https://perma.cc/FQ4P-QE
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Transfusion—Missouri and Colorado, 2008, 59 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1335,
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tions and 20 HIV-positive blood components released each year
could potentially infect recipients.”245 These numbers are small,
given the approximately 13.6 million units of blood that are collect-
ed in a year,246 and one study suggests that the predictive models
themselves vastly over-predict the risks associated with MSM do-
nations.247 Still, insofar as the risk is greater than zero, it is entirely
possible that a gay donor who would have been deferred under the
lifetime or one-year bans, but who is allowed to donate under a re-
vised policy or an exemption, could unwittingly cause an infec-
tion—just as a non-MSM donor can. The backlash, should that
happen, could be fierce.
This is especially so because something as visceral as blood is at
issue. The disgust that is at the root of so much animus against
lesbians and, especially, gay men248 is closely tied to fluids such as
blood, linked as they are to notions of animality249 and contagion.250
245. Id. at 1338.
246. BARBEE I. WHITAKER ET AL., THE 2013 AABB BLOOD COLLECTION, UTILIZATION, AND
PATIENT BLOOD MANAGEMENT SURVEY REPORT 1-2, 44 (2015) (“High-risk behavior deferrals
are intended to reduce the risk of transmission of infectious diseases, including HIV and
hepatitis viruses. Deferrals for other medical reasons may include exposure to human-derived
growth hormone, bovine insulin, hepatitis B immune globulin, unlicensed vaccines, or those
presenting with physical conditions or symptoms that disqualify a person from donating
blood.”).
247. See Germain, supra note 223, at 1603, 1607.
248. See MICHAEL NAVA & ROBERT DAWIDOFF, CREATED EQUAL: WHY GAY RIGHTS MATTER
TO AMERICA 5 (1994) (“The revulsion many men and women feel at the thought of sexual
activity between people of their own sex remains a formidable obstacle on the path of gay
rights. This revulsion, which we call the Ick Factor, equates distaste with immorality.”);
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 18 (2010) (“[T]here is no doubt that the body of the gay man has been a central
locus of disgust-anxiety—above all, for other men. Female homosexuals may be objects of fear,
or moral indignation, or generalized anxiety; but they have less often been objects of dis-
gust.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the Constitution of
Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1013-14 (2005); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sticky
Intuitions and the Future of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1375, 1391
n.71 (2010).
249. See generally NUSSBAUM, supra note 248, at 14-15 (noting that the “primary objects
of disgust,” such as bodily fluids, remind us of human animality); Paul Rozin et al., Disgust,
in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 757, 761-62 (Michael Lewis et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008) (arguing that
disgust arises out of our efforts to distance ourselves from our animal nature).
250. See generally MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF
POLLUTION AND TABOO (1966) (writing that feelings of disgust are related to community fears
of contagion); Eskridge, supra note 248, at 1025-26 (connecting Douglas’s work to the concern
with blood and “admonitions against the mixing of the pure and the impure” in Leviticus);
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Drawing a link from Hebrew scriptures to modern antigay move-
ments such as Anita Bryant’s “Save Our Children” campaign,
Professor William Eskridge has shown the continued power of
Leviticus’s link between “sexually disgusting conduct” and “pollu-
tion”: the “mixing of pure and impure things.”251 Some pollution is
thought to be beyond purification; according to Leviticus, men who
sleep with other men shall be killed, and significantly, “their blood
shall be upon them.”252
The MSM blood ban thus combines two of disgust’s most potent
triggers: blood253 and sex between men.254 And as Professor Suzanne
Goldberg has argued, “the hypersexualization of gay people, relative
to heterosexuals, in the public imagination” has a multiplier effect
that “likely heightens the power and effect of disgust in conflicts
regarding gay people’s rights.”255 It may even be that these triggers
can reinforce each other. In an article descriptively titled Disgusting
Smells Cause Decreased Liking of Gay Men, psychologists induced
disgust in test subjects using a “novelty stink spray” and found that
it led even political liberals to express less positive feelings about
gay men—though not as much about lesbians and not at all about
African Americans and the elderly.256 Trying to advance the rights
of gay men—already traditional targets of disgust—in the context
of something as disgust-inducing as blood might therefore be self-
defeating. In a context like that, even liberals might be less sympa-
thetic to gay rights claims.
DANIEL KELLY, YUCK! THE NATURE AND MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF DISGUST 137-52 (2011)
(tracing disgust to evolutionary mechanisms guarding against poisons and parasites which
gave rise to cultural purity norms, especially surrounding sexual activity and bodily fluids,
meant to protect against contagion and impurity).
251. Eskridge, supra note 248, at 1026.
252. Leviticus 20:13 (King James).
253. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 248, at 17 (“[T]he bodily substances people encounter in
sex (semen, sweat, feces, menstrual blood) are very often found disgusting and seen as
contaminants.”).
254. See id. at 18 (“The idea of semen and feces mixing together inside the body of a male
is one of the most disgusting ideas imaginable—to males, for whom the idea of nonpenetra-
bility is a sacred boundary against stickiness, ooze, and death.”).
255. Goldberg, supra note 248, at 1391.
256. See Yoel Inbar et al., Disgusting Smells Cause Decreased Liking of Gay Men, 12
EMOTION 23, 24-25 (2012); see also David Pizarro, The Strange Politics of Disgust, TED (Oct.
23, 2012), https://archive.org/details/DavidPizarro_2012X [https://perma.cc/Y7FA-6K6V]
(analyzing the reactions of disgust between conservatives and liberals).
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Finally, I have presented the religious gay blood donor’s claim not
as self-interested, like some other religious freedom claims,257 but as
an altruistic one, rooted in longstanding notions of Christian char-
ity.258 But not everyone shares that characterization. As a senior
fellow at the National Catholic Bioethics Center has written: “A
blood drive is not the place to assert your view of ‘equality’—or
worse, to exercise your ‘rights.’ The narcissism evident in [resistance
to the MSM ban] is the very antithesis of what blood drives are all
about.”259
I have described the religious gay blood donor’s lawsuit as a
potentially stereotype-breaking one: one that challenges the oppo-
sition between gays and religion260 and foregrounds a gay plaintiff
who is out to help others, not himself.261 But opponents of his effort
see things quite differently. The stereotype of “narcissistic” gays262
grasping for “special rights”263 lurks even here. In fact, it is one of
the downsides of the religious freedom, rather than equal protection,
approach. The former, with its individual exceptions to generally
applicable laws, raises the specter of “special rights” in a way that
equality claims do not. As Judge O’Scannlain has described it,
RFRA provides that “sincere religious objectors must be given a pass
to defy obligations that apply to the rest of us, if refusing to exempt
or to accommodate them would impose a substantial burden on their
sincere exercise of religion.”264 The fact that our plaintiff, if he wins,
257. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
259. Matthew Hanley, The Right to Give Blood?, CATH. THING (Sept. 28, 2013), https://
www.thecatholicthing.org/2013/09/28/the-right-to-give-blood/ [https://perma.cc/SDY8-7CCS].
260. See supra text accompanying note 77.
261. See supra text accompanying note 79.
262. See, e.g., Susan Bordo, Gay Men’s Revenge, 57 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 21, 21
(1997) (“The gay male’s narcissism ... is such a constant trope in Hollywood’s depiction of
homosexuality that it is startling when it is absent.”).
263. See Samuel A. Marcosson, The “Special Rights” Canard in the Debate over Lesbian and
Gay Civil Rights, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 137, 140 (1995); see also Shauna
Fisher, It Takes (at Least) Two to Tango: Fighting with Words in the Conflict Over Same-Sex
Marriage, in QUEER MOBILIZATIONS: LGBT ACTIVISTS CONFRONT THE LAW 207, 210 (Scott
Barclay et al. eds., 2009) (“[A]nticivil rights groups coopted the language of equal rights and
interpreted rights claims by ... marginalized groups as excessive and exclusive and as
undermining a[ ] historical commitment to equality. Labeling certain rights claims as ‘special’
rights delegitimizes them and sets them up in opposition to legitimate equal rights claims.”).
264. United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2016).
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would be “given a pass”265 to avoid the usual FDA regulations might
feed the very stereotype gay rights advocates have long resisted.
The lawsuit that I have touted here as a win-win might be one
from the perspective of the judgment (winning by winning),266 or of
cabined RFRA doctrine (winning by losing).267 But the lawsuit might
still reinforce notions that gays are interested in pursuing their—
our—rights at any cost, worried more about dignitary harms than
public health, and putting equality over the public good. A win-win
strategy in court does not necessarily equate to a public relations
victory. Perhaps that explains why the strategy described here has
never yet been deployed.
CONCLUSION
Before RFRA was passed in 1993, conservative legislators and
Catholic groups worried that it would be used by liberals to poke
holes in abortion restrictions.268 Twenty-five years later, it is fair to
say that their fears have proven misplaced. Plaintiffs such as Hobby
Lobby and the Little Sisters of the Poor have invoked RFRA in the
context of reproductive rights, but from the other direction—using
religious freedom to poke holes in the Affordable Care Act’s contra-
ception mandate.269 Along the way, they have benefitted from an
increasingly expansive view of RFRA: one that defers to plaintiffs
on the substantiality of the burdens they face and countenances
religious exemptions that impose burdens of their own, whether on
the government or possibly on third parties.270
The fact that RFRA has flipped in this way is not just ironic; it
should be instructive. Appropriating the arguments and successes
265. See id.
266. See supra Part III.A.
267. See supra Part III.B.
268. See Lederman, supra note 155, at 429 (“[T]hey feared that, as originally drafted, it
might compel exemptions to abortion restrictions for women who claimed they were religiously
motivated to choose abortion. Although the idea might appear far-fetched in retrospect, the
prospect that RFRA would become the engine of abortion rights dominated the legislative
debates, and prevented enactment of the bill for almost two years.” (footnotes omitted)).
269. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759, 2785 (2014); Little
Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1159 (10th Cir. 2015),
vacated and remanded by Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016)).
270. See, e.g., supra notes 150-56, 215-20 and accompanying text (discussing Hobby Lobby).
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of religious conservatives for progressive ends serves as a caution-
ary reminder that religious liberty works both ways.271 Reading
RFRA more broadly means protecting not just “free thought for
those who agree with us but freedom for the thought”—and the re-
ligious practices—“that we hate.”272
Given the interplay of the religious and political, moral and doc-
trinal commitments at stake in the case of the religious gay blood
donor, I am hesitant to predict how the case would turn out. Would
courts follow recent doctrinal trends and fashion an exemption for
the would-be donor?273 Would they instead find a way of distinguish-
ing and cabining the more expansive interpretations of RFRA’s
substantial burden and narrow tailoring requirements?274 Would
gay rights organizations support a suit like this, given what both
winning and losing it might achieve? Or would they be wary of rely-
ing on a line of doctrine that they have opposed, or of bringing a suit
that could lead to moral or disgust-fueled blacklash?275 Finally, what
would religious liberty advocates do? Some take pride in the fact
that they support religious freedom claims by members of all faiths,
“from Anglicans to Zoroastrians,” as the Becket Fund puts it.276
Would the organizations most responsible for broadening RFRA’s
scope277 apply their gains to the religious gay blood donor—or not?
Insofar as this Article is meant as a roadmap for advocacy—not
just as a thought experiment or reductio argument against current
religious liberty law—uncertainty on these questions is a bit
271. This is true, at least, for a neutral religious freedom law such as RFRA. But see Pro-
tecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act, H.B. 1523, 2016 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016) (protecting only “the belief or conviction that: (a) Marriage is or should
be recognized as the union of one man and one woman; (b) Sexual relations are properly re-
served to such a marriage; and (c) Male (man) or female (woman) refer to an individual’s im-
mutable biological sex as objectively determined by anatomy and genetics at time of birth”).
The point also applies to a law such as the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (2012),
which does not mention religious liberty but was passed with that in mind—only to be em-
ployed later to promote pro-LGBT efforts such as gay-straight alliances in public schools. See
Susan Broberg, Note, Gay/Straight Alliances and Other Controversial Student Groups: A New
Test for the Equal Access Act, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 87, 88.
272. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
273. See supra Part III.A.
274. See supra Part III.B.
275. See supra notes 247-55 and accompanying text.
276. Our Mission, BECKET, https://www.becketlaw.org/about-us/mission/ [https://perma.cc/
D4EG-SQTT].
277. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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concerning. I am confident about the best arguments to be made on
behalf of the religious gay blood donor, admittedly less sure about
whether they should be made. Part III hopefully showed that, as a
legal matter, the case is a win-win for progressives. The question
going forward is whether considerations beyond the law—the wor-
ries traced in Part IV—are enough to convince gay rights advocates
that the win might not be worth the cost.
